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This thesis presents, in a case study format, the con-
flict between Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company
and the Navy over the execution of the option to build the
CGN-Ul. In the case, the reader is taken from the time of
the signing of the original contract in 1971 through the
events leading to the negotiated settlement reached by Mr.
Gordon Rule.
Emphasis is placed on Newport News' contention that this
option was invalid, the events leading to a work stoppage by
Newport News and a Federal District Court's order for both
parties to negotiate in good faith, and finally the events
leading to Mr. Rule's appointment and the validity of the
agreement by him with Newport News. Additional inform.ation
is provided as Technical Notes to the case, which include:
Shipbuilding in the U. S., Newport News, Ship Procurement and
Claims Procedures. A Teaching Note is provided to assist in
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All those within the organization of the Navy are aware
of the much publicized magnitudes of the shipbuilding claims
and cost overruns. These are said to be the results of poor
management on the part of those tasked with ship acquisition.
There is also an increased awareness of these problems by
those in the Congress and in the Executive. While many have
prescribed increased procurement education and experience in
acquisition management, this may be an inadequate remedy for
the shipbuilding malady. Specifically, present acquisition
management training seems to concentrate on the procurement
of lesser weapon systems and aircraft. It is the conviction
of the authors that, in order to understand and apply manage-
ment skills effectively to shipbuilding, the training mate-
rials must be made relevant to the shipbuilding problem. In
other words , in order to find solutions to ship procurement
problems through study, an individual must study shipbuild-
ing problems
.
B. THE CASE METHOD OF STUDY
An excellent tool used by most leading management schools
is the case method. This method consists of presenting the
student with a large number of facts describing a management
problem. The student is left to define the problem, identify

contributing factors, and propose solutions with implementa-
tion plans for the solutions. Often a number of alterna-
tives are developed and ranked based on their expected costs
and expected results. Thus, a case study provides the oppor-
tunity to apply models and hypotheses to what is hoped are
realistic circumstances
.
In keeping with the case method, the authors have attemp-
ted to describe the current ship procurement problem in a
manner that introduces the student to this problem but does
not provide the student with an instant focus on the objec-
tives of the authors. Teaching notes, however, are provided
to the instructor. Because of this, much of the amplifying
information or explanatory comment in the text is missing.
Also, questions asked by the student in the early chapters
will be discussed in later chapters. The student is expected
to use an outline to construct his own perceptions.
Group discussion after individual study greatly increases
the benefit of the case. The student is expected to take
issue with much of the material in this case and also to find
topics which he will want to pursue further on his own.
C. THE CGN-41 CHOICE
The CGN-41 case, while not a claims case, covers those
issues in a claims dispute, plus other matters, that are
often lost to those concentrating on claims; notably, greater
insight may be gained into the aims of those involved in
actual government-contractor negotiation. This case involves




, and the involvement of all three branches of
our democratic system. Most important, it has evoked strong
and clear expression of the values and perceptions of those
involved.
The authors hope that this study will result in a better
understanding of shipbuilding problems. At the very least,
our objective is to fostei' greater respect for the opinion
of those closest to the problem than is evident in such often-
heard solutions as "the problem will go away when Rickover




The Naval Center for Acquisition Research has only recent-
ly been established at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey. Many supportive activities within the Department
of Defense have made available their files for the express
purpose of developing more relevant training materials. In
addition to this rich source, much information was found in
the public record of testimony and material provided to Con-
gressional committee hearings over the past ten 'years. In-
cluded in that material was the Court Decision in the case.
Much was found in Navy manuals, instructions, and funded
studies
.
The authors were afforded the opportunity to interview
Mr. Gordon Rule, Admiral Manganaro, various project managers,
and other Department of Defense officials. During the past
two years , the authors have taken advantage of the visits
11

of these and others to the Naval Postgraduate School to ask
off-the-record questions. While this information was in-
valuable in guiding the authors, the material in the case
is taken from the written sources . Although the absence of
this off-the-record comment is not important to the use of
the case, in order that they may appreciate the concern,
dedication, time and energy devoted toward solution of ship-
building problems by cognizant Navy officials , it is hoped
that similar opportunity could be afforded to those who
study ship procurement.
E. A SHIP ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT COURSE
While this case might be used in a number of different
management courses, it is designed to be used with other
cases in a course devoted solely to ship acquisition. In
this course, contract types, industrial capabilities, labor
law, escalation procedures, profit studies, and other topics





II. THE NAVY LOSES CGN-41 CONTEST
A. CGN-41 DEADLOCK
After a year in the Federal District Court of Eastern
Virginia, the Navy, in mid-19 75, faced an impass of not be-
ing able to reach a settlement with its contractor, Newport
News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company (NNSDCO), over the
validity of an option to build the nuclear guided missile
cruiser, CGN-41. The contractor had stopped work on the
ship and the Navy had taken the company to court to obtain
an injunction to force NNSDCO to continue work. Under pres-
sure from the DoD , the Navy, represented by the Attorney
General's office, agreed to a court order to negotiate a
settlement of the option.
Despite the agreement, the positions of both sides (the
Navy and NNSDCO) remained unchanged. The Navy felt that it
could not negotiate unresolved clauses within the option
without renegotiating the validity of the option, and the
contractor insisted that this option was invalid. On 13
July 19 76, the contractor petitioned the Court, arguing that
the Navy had not negotiated as agreed to earlier and request-
ing that the agreement to work on the CGN-41 be suspended.
On 16 July 1976, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ISL)
Bowers issued a memorandum designating Mr. Gordon W. Rule
as the Navy's Chief CGN-Ul negotiator. Also, that day Rule
reported to DEPSECDEF Clements that he had had his first
13

meeting with Newport News and that his "...failure to con-
tact the Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Repair Newport News
2
was not accidental."
B. RULE NEGOTIATION AND TURMOIL
Rule opened negotations by contrasting his own style of
seeking a nonadversary position with that of the Navy's pre-
vious negotiator Rear Admiral Woodfin, whom Rule quoted as
saying that the adverse relations were inevitable.
After almost daily negotiations, on 20 August 1976 an
oral agreement between Rule and Newport News was reached.
The Court found that this understanding covered all outstand-
ing substantive issues concerning the construction of CGN-Ul,
including those charged to Mr. Rule by DEPSECDEF Clements.
This agreement was to be labeled Contract Modification
P00037.
^
It is noted that on 19 August 1976, the Office of the
CNM issued to Mr. Rule a Certificate of Appointment as Con-
tracting Officer which recited that he had "...unlimited
authority to negotiate with the shipyard concerning the CGN-
hi contract dispute..." An ASECNAV Bower memorandum stated
that Mr. Rule was appointed to negotiate without involvement
of the Department of Justice but with the assistance of the
Navy's General Counsel.
On the 2 3rd of August (by telephone) and again on the
2Uth (in writing). Admiral Rickover informed the Chief of
Naval Material that he had heard rumors that a settlement had
been reached and that if so, any settlement reached must be
14

reviewed to see that it was within the original contract or
settled under PL 85-804. Admiral Rickover volunteered to
provide assistance in any review based on his own knowledge
of the events in question.
On 2 5 August, Newport News issued a press release announc-
ing the settlement. Admiral Rickover stated that this must
have caught those senior members of the Navy by surprise as
they had been denying the settlement. The press release
had been cleared through retired Vice Admiral Eli Reich, a
DEPSECDEF Clements consultant, and Mr. Gordon Rule.
The Navy issued its own release that Mr. Rule's settle-
ment was under review.
On 2 6 August, CNM sent a memorandum to Admiral Rickover
telling him to stand clear of the negotiations unless tech-
nical areas concerning nuclear propulsion were involved.
He also stated that a letter, such as Rickover' s broadly dis-
tributed letter (24 August memorandum), would cause disrupt-
ing perturbations to the negotiating process. In a response
to the CNM memorandum. Admiral Rickover said that not inform-
ing cognizant Navy officials of the matters involved in the
settlement "was analogous to not warning my mother that she
7
was about to fall off a cliff."
In regard to the rumored settlement. Admiral Rickover
stated that he had heard the following rumors:
(1) The Navy General Counsel was present but Navy law-
yers were not;
(2) Neither the lawyers nor NAVSEA did clear or review
in advance the agreement, and
15

(3) The cost to the Navy was not identified before the
agreement was made. Receipt of the draft of the
agreement from Newport News would be necessary prior
to the Navy's discovery of the cost.
In a letter on 24 August to Attorney General E. Levi,
Senator Proxmire related that senior DoD officials were ad-
vocating Congressional approval for a quick settlement with
Newport News beyond the terms of the contract, and that, in
so doing, they were at odds with testimony of expert Navy
witnesses who were directly involved with the contracts. He
also noted that, although there was a Navy board assigned to
handle the Newport News claims, Gordon Rule had been assigned
as Chief Negotiator for the CGN-41. The Senator commented
that Mr. Rule had publicly laid the responsibility for the
Newport News problems directly on the Navy and that a man's
views might undermine the Government's ability to enforce
contracts. He concluded that there were those DoD officials
who would sacrifice the public interest by turning over to
shipbuilders sums of money far in excess of the amount agreed
to in contracts
.
C. RULE'S EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT
On 30 August, Adm. Michaelis , CNM, appointed a review
panel of three Navy persons and granted them sole and final
g
authority to bind the Navy to a compromise.
At 6:00 P.M. on 7 October 1976, Mr. Rule signed a final
draft of the 20 August agreement. On 8 October, he was handed
a document dated 7 October 1976 stating. .. "you do not have
16

authority to bind the Government contractually on the pro-
posed modification to CGN-41 until the legal and business
9
reviews have been completed..." Gordon Rule subsequently
delivered the signed agreement to Newport News. The agree-
ment was subject to two additional conditions:
(1) Deputy Defense Secretary Clements' approval, and
(2) Labor escalation was to be at the lesser rate of
125% of the Bureau of Labor Statistics indices or
actual experience.
On 15 October, Mr. Clements forwarded a copy of this
writing executed by Mr. Rule to the Attorney General, Mr.
Levi, and in his cover letter referred to Mr. Rule's settle-
ment as a "reasonable resolution to this complex matter."
Subsequently the Justice Department informed the Court that
the Attorney General would disapprove Mr. Rule's compromise
settlement
.
To sum the various NAVSEA objections to Mr. Rule's settle-
ment, the agreement was a license for the Navy to negotiate
new optional delivery dates doing violence to the original
contract. The Government had the right to the original de-
livery date and could not relinquish it without adequate com-
pensation or through extraordinatory relief under PL85-804.
D. THE COURT RULING
The Court ruled that Mr. Rule's settlement was valid and
binding. It also found that the Government had not been
negotiating in good faith until the appointment of Gordon
Rule, but rather had clung to the best and final offer, that
17

had been its position before entering the Court. The Court
stated that in its opinion of the case, that had the Govern-
ment requested a decision on the option validity after the
motion had been filed, they would have had the decision
within six to seven months. The Court ruled out the posi-
tion of insufficient consideration for the settlement on the
basis that Newport News agreed to drop its request for claim
considerations which they valued at $22 million. The judge
found the Government had delayed entering the CGN-38, 39 and
40 changes into the CGN-41 and, therefore, felt the claims
justified.
E. POST COURT REACTION
The Navy debated for some time whether or not to pursue
an appeal of the case. Some feel that the case allows a
contracting officer to receive value for change simply on
his evaluation of the Government benefit and that this bene-
fit will require no other supporting evidence.
Specifically, as Admiral Rickover testified to a Con-
gressional Subcommittee, "The Comptroller General has long
held that no Government contracting officer is empowered to
relinquish the Government's rights without obtaining a com-
pensating benefit or adequate consideration. In return,
that is, the quid must equal the quo in any quid pro quo.
In many Navy eyes this agreement amounts to extra contrac-





III. A LOOK BACK
A. THE PROCUREMENT ENVIRONMENT
The agreement reached on 20 August 1976, with NNSDCO by
Mr. Gordon Rule, should have settled the CGN-41 issue, but
instead, the controversy still raged within the Navy as to
whether or not this was a fair settlement from the Navy's
standpoint. This is a good point on which to reflect back
to the events leading up to the Rule agreement.
Before reviewing the actual events which culminated in
Mr. Rule's agreement, we should look at the environment
within which the procurement of ships is undertaken. The
Navy organization is shown in Exhibits 1 and 2. From these
it can be seen how complex the organization is, with its
many layers of responsibility. Because of the nature of
government and the Navy, the people who head the various or-
ganizations in charge of ship procurement change periodical-
ly. When the people change, the direction taken in the com-
position of the fleet changes also.
ADM Rickover in his introductory comments to the House
of Representatives Subcommittee of the Appropriations Com-
mittee brought out how often these players change. He
stated:
"...I have been responsible for directing the Navy Nuclear
Propulsion Program for over 2 8 years under seven adminis-
trations. During this time there have been: 14 Secretaries
of Defense--Forrestal , Johnson, Marshall, Lovett , Wilson,
McElroy, Gates, McNamara, Clifford, Laird, Richardson,
19

Schlesinger, Rumsfeld, and Brown, 16 Deputy Secretaries of
Defense--Early , Lovett, Foster, Kyes, Anderson, Robertson,
Qualies , Gates, Douglas, Gilpatric, Vance, Nitze, Packard,
Ruch , Clements, and Duncan; 13 Directors of Defense Re-
search and Engineering, including former positions of
Chairman, Research and Development Board, and Assistant
Secretary for Research and Engineering--Bush , Compton,
Webster, Whitman, Qualies, Furnas, Newburg, Foote , York,
Brown, Foster, Curie, and Parker (Acting); 8 Assistants
to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, including
former Chairmen of the Military Liaison Committee-Carpenter,
Webster, LeBaron, Loper, Johnson, Howard, Walske, and
Cotter; 15 Secretaries of the Navy--Sullivan , Matthews,
Kimball, Anderson, Thomas, Gates, Franke , Conally, Korth
,
Nitze, Ignatius, Chafee , Warner, Middendorf and Clayton;
18 Under Secretaries of the Navy--Kenney , Kimball, White-
hair, Thomas, Gates, France, Bantz, Foy , Belieu, Baldwin,
Band, Warner, Sanders, Middendorf, Potter, Bowers (Acting),
MacDonald, and Woolsey; 11 Chiefs of Naval Operations--
Nimitz, Denfeld, Sherman, Fechteler, Carney, Burke, Ander-
son, McDonald, Moorer, Zumwalt, Holloway; IM- Vice Chiefs
of Naval Operations--Radford, Price, McCormick, Duncan,
Felt
, Russell , Ricketts , Rivers , Clarey, Cousins, Weisner,
Holloway, Bagley, and Shear; 5 Chiefs of Naval Material
since the position was established in 196 3--Schoech , Galan-
tin, Arnold, Kidd, and Michaelis; and 11 Commanders of the
Naval Sea Systems Command, including the former positions
of Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command, and Chief, Bureau
of Ships--Mills , Clark, Wallin, Leggett, Mumma , James,
Brockett, Fahy , Sonenshein, Gooding, and Bryan."!
The effect people can have on the acquisition strategy
can be illustrated by the following:
In 19 70, when Admiral Zumwalt became Chief of Naval
Operations , he brought with him a ship procurement program
referred to as Project 60 or the High-Low mix. In essence,
this program was considered to reverse the trend in procure-
ment of all expensive ships in small numbers , whose use is
primarily to project American influence abroad, as in the
Korean and Vietnam Wars. It was felt that there was a need
for larger numbers of smaller, less expensive, less vulner-
able platforms to protect the lines of communications. Here
less vulnerable refers to the loss to the Navy due to the
20

loss of a single platform. When Admiral Zumwalt came to of-
fice, he saw as the current high cost ships: the LHA, CVN,
DLGN (CGN), SSN-688 and DD-963. He decided to expedite the
CVN, cut back the LHA program, which was already far behind
schedule, and not to expedite the DD-96 3 or DLGN (CGN). The
low portion of his programs included a 170 ton hydrofoil
patrol boat, PHM, armed with a new weapon, the Harpoon mis-
sile system. It also included a small patrol frigate, PF
(now FFG) to cost less than $50 million, and an "austere"
carrier called the Sea Control Ship to cost $100 million in
21973 dollars or 1/8 the cost of a nuclear carrier.
Admiral Zumwalt saw FY' 74 as the first year in which he
could approach Congress for approval of his proposed low-
mix ships. Admiral Zumwalt felt that he needed support from
one other party. Admiral Rickover. To achieve this support.
Admiral Zumwalt agreed to request five ships in each of the
first two flights of the SSN-588 project in FY' 72 and '73.
Admiral Zumwalt had planned on the CGN-36 through 40, but
not the CGN-41 and 42. Admiral Rickover went to the home of
the Secretary of Defense for dinner and personally swayed
him to include $244 million more in the FY' 75 budget for the
CGN- 41 and 42. Admiral Zumwalt was promised by the Secretary
of Defense that this money would not come from ships already
in the program, but, to date, only the FFG program remains
a viable program, with the PHM program having only been re-
3instituted after a short period of inactivity.
Another example of how people affect the acquisition
strategy was given by Admiral Rickover in testimony before
21

the Appropriations Committee Subcommittee of the House of
Representatives on how the AEGIS weapon system was to be
deployed. He stated:
"Up to April 19 71, Navy programs were based on all AEGIS
ships being nuclear powered. It was planned to modify future
VIRGINIA (CGN-38) class nuclear cruisers to accommodate
AEGIS. In April 1971, Secretary of Defense Laird, under
pressure from the Office of Management and Budget, cancelled
the third NIMITZ class carrier, the CVN-70, and the two
nuclear cruisers, CGN-Ul and 42. He also cancelled the
Navy's future plans for building AEGIS equipped nuclear
cruisers. During the next two years, in response to the
Congressional reaction, the Defense Department restored the
CVN-70 and the CGN-41 and 42. Congress subsequently can-
called the CGN-U2 , ostensibly because it did not have the
AEGIS system."
"In 19 73, Admiral Zumwalt , who was then the Chief of
Naval Operations, recommended starting a class of gas tur-
bine powered AEGIS destroyers in FY 1977 and a class of modi-
fied VIRGINIA size nuclear cruisers with AEGIS in FY 1978.
Secretary of the Navy Warner requested that the CNO investi-
gate 'the feasibility of building a single new class of air-
craft carrier escort, nuclear powered, vice the two now
planned...' In a meeting I attended on 12 October 1973,
Admiral Zumwalt chose a program of 16 gas turbine powered
AEGIS ships and eight nuclear AEGIS ships to provide two
AEGIS ships per carrier for a projected force level of 12
carriers, of which four were already authorized to be nuclear.
22

He said he based his decision on the assumption that all
future carriers would be non-nuclear. This was a few months
after his recommendation to plan on a fourth NIMITZ class
carrier to be authorized in FY 19 78 had been turned down
and the Deputy Secretary of Defense had directed the CVX
study I referred to earlier."
"Admiral Holloway became Chief of Naval Operations in
July 19 74, a month before Title VIII became law. Based on
his review of future shipbuilding plans , he recommended that
future carriers be nuclear powered. He also recommended,
and the Navy adopted his position, that the Navy build 18
nuclear powered strike cruisers, CSGN's in lieu of the prior
proposed mix of 16 non-nuclear and eight nuclear ships with
AEGIS. He proposed that each of the strike cruisers be made
larger than the VIRGINIA class in order to accommodate more
weapons and to give the ships greater capability to operate
independently as strike force units."
"In a letter of December 6, 19 74 to the Seapower Sub-
committee of the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral
Holloway proposed a four-year program for building AEGIS
ships. This program called for six nuclear powered strike
cruisers, CSGN's to be authorized in the four-year period
from fiscal 1977 through fiscal 1980, and no conventional
AEGIS ships."
"The Navy subsequently recommended to the Secretary of
Defense that, in addition to all new construction AEGIS
ships being CSGN's, AEGIS should be introduced into the
fleet by converting the nuclear cruiser LONG BEACH to AEGIS
23

as soon as possible. The Defense Department disapproved the
18 CSGN program and the LONG BEACH AEGIS conversion proposed
by the Navy. The Navy continued to recommend that the first
new AEGIS ship be a CSGN in FY 19 77 with advance procurement
funds in FY 19 76. The Defense Department then cut the Navy's
FY 19 77 budget guidance by an amount equivalent to the CSGN
and persuaded the Navy to recommend in the FY 19 77 program a
DD-963 type ship with AEGIS; this was named the DDG-U7 class."
"However, in June 1975, President Ford disapproved this
DoD/Navy recommendation to build a non-nuclear AEGIS ship.
He amended his FY 19 76 budget request to provide advance pro-
curement funds in the FY 19 76 budget for the first nuclear
strike cruiser to be authorized in the FY 19 77 program. The
Congress did not authorize the long lead funds. The Navy pro-
gram was then changed to four nuclear strike cruisers to be
built over the five-year period FY 1977-81, along with seven
conventional ships. However, by the time President Ford sub-
mitted his revised shipbuilding plans in early 19 76, there
were eight conventional AEGIS ships and only two nuclear
strike cruisers to be built in this same five-year period.
At that time, the five-year plan also included two nuclear
carriers, both of which were ultimately dropped by the Ford
Administration. Congress did not approve starting either
the CSGN or DDG-U7 programs in FY 1977. Instead, Congress
directed that the existing nuclear cruiser LONG BEACH be the
first AEGIS ship and appropriated $371 million in FY 1977 to
start the conversion. Whether or not the LONG BEACH is con-
verted to AEGIS, it will require an extensive overhaul and
24

partial modernization (estimated to cost about $264 million).
The extra cost to give it a full AEGIS strike cruiser capa- •
bility was estimated to be an additional $500 million. As
you know, the LONG BEACH conversion to AEGIS has now been
cancelled, and the $371 million appropriated in FY 1977 re-
scissioned.
"
"In January 19 77, President Ford submitted a five-year
shipbuilding program from FY 19 78 through FY 19 82, which in-
cluded two smaller conventional carriers, two CSGN's and ten
DDG-'47 class AEGIS ships. The new Administration subsequent-
4ly cancelled the nuclear strike cruiser program entirely."
B. BIOGRAPHIES
To gain an insight to the positions taken by the major
players within the Department of Defense, a look at their
backgrounds will be beneficial.
1. Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements
Before entering into government service, Mr. Clements
was chairman of an oil drilling company and was a director
of the First National Bank of Dallas.
He first entered government service in 1969 as part
of President Nixon's "blue ribbon" defense panel. He then
became, in 19 72, co-chairman for President Nixon's re-elec-




Admiral Rickover assumed his present position in
1949. He is the Deputy Commander for Nuclear Propulsion,
25

Naval Sea Systems Command and he is also Director of the
Division of Naval Reactors within ERDA.
To appreciate the status gained by Adm. Rickover
the location of his two positions within their parent or-
ganizations must be examined. As can be seen from the Navy
organizational charts, Exhibit 3, his office is low in the
organization and he is a fourth level official within what
was then the AEC , Atomic Energy Commission.
He was selected Rear Admiral in 1953. In 1962
President Kennedy extended him on active duty for two more
years past the mandatory retirement age of 62. Since then,
every two years Admiral Rickover has received an extension
to remain on active duty.
3 . Gordon Rule
Gordon Rule joined the Navy in 1942 as a Lieutenant
and went to inactive duty in 1946 after being promoted to
the rank of Captain. He returned to active duty during the
Korean War and assumed the position of Deputy Director and
Acting Director of the Contracts Division in the Bureau of
Ships. He then returned to inactive duty as a reservist.
He authored "The Art of Negotiation" in 1962 which
he donated to the Government and this publication is used as
a textbook for training purposes by the Navy, Army, Foreign
Service Institute and consultants teaching on behalf of the
Department of Defense.
In 196 3, he returned to the Navy as a civilian in
the position of Director of the Procurement Control and
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Clearance Division in Headquarters of the Naval Material
Command. He retired at the end of 1976.
In November 196 7 he was awarded the Navy Superior
Civilian Service Award and in February 1971 he was awarded
the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Award.
In 19 72, when Adm. Kidd was Chief of Naval Material,
Gordon Rule was asked to resign his position because of
testimony he gave before Congress regarding the appointment
of Mr. Roy Ash as Director of 0MB, who at the time was
President of Litton Industries. He refused to resign his
position, so Adm. Kidd transferred him to a lesser respon-
sible position. He was reinstated to his original position
7
after intervention by Senator Proxmire.
C. PEOPLE TO BUILD SHIPS
1. Labor
In the preceding sections, the uncertain atmosphere
surrounding ship procurement and the three significant
Government players were presented. NNSDCO's President J. P.
Diesel must attempt to make long range plans in a volatile
environment which poses many problems, especially with regard
to labor. There are two major challenges to the shipbuilding
industry: (1) Recruitment and retention of skilled labor and
(2) the development of a manpower pool sufficient to expand
operations
.
It would appear that the number one problem facing
all three of the largest Naval ship contractors, Newport News,
General Dynamics and Litton, was the non-availability of
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labor. Although in 19 74 unemployment exceeded 5% nationally,
unemployment in the local areas of these yards was a low 3%.
The results of this situation were described by the president
of Ingalls Shipbuilding Company (Leonard Erb ) when he said
that if a local loses his false teeth at a neighborhood bar,
he comes to work for Litton until his problem is solved and
o
then quits. All three of these major builders expanded
operations in the early '70's. Litton more than doubled its
capacity at Pascagoula, Mississippi, to become the largest
shipyard in area in the United States.
Tenneco's expansion of the Newport News yard, while
not as large as the Pascagoula expansion, took place in an
area with much higher competition for labor. In order to
meet Newport News goals for the shipbuilding yard, it was
necessary to increase from 25,000 employees in 1972 to 33,000
in 1974.
Hiring problems were already apparent in 1971 and
1972 when recruiting from the local and middle Atlantic area
resulted in filling only 58% of the shipyard's vacant posi-
9
tions. Skilled occupations must almost totally be recruited
locally, as these individuals do not like to relocate. There
are two major local competitors for skilled workers, partic-
ularly, welders, shipfitters , and pipefitters, namely the
Naval Shipyard Norfolk and local construction.
The Tenneco Company claims that the Government owes
$32 million in claims for unfair naval shipyard recruiting
practices. Admiral Rickover says that this figure amounts
to $42 thousand per recruit, which would pay for a Harvard
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education. Wages are 11% higher for the skills in the
naval shipyard and 30% higher in civilian construction.
The Navy yard also offered greater job security. High hous-
ing costs in the Newport News-Hampton area could easily
account for one fourth of a worker's pay and is a driving
force to seek employment at the higher wages.
These conditions also result in a high turnover
rate. In order to maintain the status quo, Newport News in
1973 was required to hire 5 to 6 percent of its critical
skill occupations per month. This turnover rate was such
that Newport News lost an equivalent of 5 8% of the productive
labor hired compared to an industry wide 50%.
Dilution of average skill level was expected with
expansion, but when coupled with this high turnover rate,
had a more than normal effect on shipyard operation. It was
noted by some Naval personnel that those supervising at the
middle levels one year were by necessity moved to more respon-
sible positions and often their replacements were not visible
Contrary to normal learning experienced in the past, the con-
tractor was expending increased productive man-hours on sub-
marine refueling to accomplish non-nuclear work packages on
successive contracts. A comparison of the non-nuclear labor
return for SSBNs 628, 629, 635, 641 and 645 support this
statement. Where learning had been pronounced between the
first and second submarines, it ceased at that point, and
additional labor was required on each successive ship. SSBNs
62 8 and 629 were completed prior to the labor expansion and
actually experienced labor under-runs of 88,000 man-hours.
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In 1973, DCAA reported that this decreasing produc-
tivity would result in overruns of 1.7 and 1.3 million man-
hours on the DLGN 36 and DLGN 37 and 8.2 million on the
CVAN's 68 and 69 and overall would result in an increase in
cost to the Government of $89 million. In 1971 and 1972,
recruitment costs of $642 thousand were spent merely to cover
losses, while $2.8 million of training costs were lost as a
result of employee turnover. Additionally, subcontracts re-
quired by nonavailable labor increased Government costs by
an estimated $500 thousand. While Newport News has one of
the largest and most comprehensive training programs of all
private shipbuilders , it proved insufficient to meet the de-
mand. Over the two year period of 1972 to 1973, Newport News
hired some 18,000 people, but in the same period lost 17,000
employees
.
From a low in 1971, when Newport News had 18,000 em-
ployees, in 1973 they reached a high of 27,000. It was then
decided that increased employment was impossible. On 11
September 197U, the Daily Press (Hampton Roads Morning News-
paper) carried the story, "Yard Asks 16,000 to Work Six-Day,
48 Hour VJeek," in which more than 16,000 maintenance and pro-
duction workers were asked to voluntarily work 48 hours a
ek "in the... hope that this additional production time
ill help us meet our shipbuilding scheduling objectives."





J. p. Diesel as saying before the U.S. Senate Seapower Sub-
committee that a number of ships under construction "are
seriously behind schedule in terms of original contract de-
livery dates." But he also added that the so called man-
power problems were caused by an inability to utilize his
people efficiently and effectively. He went on to say that
they were planning their work but not working their plan
because of delays, defective equipment and components (some
of it government supplied), lack of material, and similar
matters
.
2 . Navy Concern over Labor
In the fall of 1972, when Newport News announced
plans to build the commercial yard for subsequent construc-
tion of the three LNG's, the shipyard had nearly the 27,000
employees. The Navy was told that the employees would be
used in the Navy 1974 program. In a policy letter dated 12
February 1973, Tenneco again stated that they would not
allow performance on non-Navy contracts which would inter-
fere with performance on Navy contracts.
The Navy felt that the low productivity was increas-
ing the man-hours required to do their work and the Navy
Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair, Newport
News (SUPSHIPNN) noted in a letter to Newport News that the
direct labor being assigned to Navy new construction in 1975
was 1000 men less per day than in 1974, and that although
changes had been kept below previous years, this gross under-
manning had been a major cause to continuing delays in Navy
new construction. From January 1975 to December 1975, labor
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on Navy new construction had declined from 14,005 to 12,674,
while labor on commercial work rose from 1,213 to 3,021 men
per day. Mr. Diesel repeatedly assured the Chief of Naval
Material and the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, that
he would provide long range man-power projections for Navy
work, but they were never furnished. Admiral Rickover feels
the decrease in productivity increased the amounts of rework
and that the labor shortage led Newport News to stretch out
Navy ship construction schedules. On this basis, he con-
cluded that, under the shipbuilding contracts, the resultant
costs of escalation and deferred work were the responsibili-
ty of the shipyard.
On the other hand, Mr. Diesel testified before the
House Armed Services Committee on Seapower in 1974, utilizing
the construction of the CVN-68 Nimitz as an example, that the
original ship design contract signed in 1967 called for ship
delivery in September of 1971, but due to material and design
problems, the construction contracted for in September 1971
was for delivery in June of 1972 or September of 197 3. Labor
planning was disrupted by the late delivery of the nuclear
reactor components and the requirement to maintain deck open-
ings for the later installation. Admiral Rickover argues
that allowances for these deliveries could have been more
properly managed. The CVN-68 was not commissioned until
1975.
3 . Other Significant Problems Involved
in Long Term Program
Other significant problems facing Newport News in long
construction periods are material availability, sole source
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subcontractors, unpredictable inflation (which reached double
digit in the early 1970's), inflation of shipbuilder's costs
(which were double that of almost all other' industries), and
the high cost of financing. There is seldom a research and
development phase in shipbuilding. "Fly before buy" does
not seem to apply; this means that there is much concurrency
in ship design and construction, resulting in inevitable rip-
out and modification. Newport News is in agreement on this
for the lead ship of a class , where time will not permit the
building of a prototype, testing it until all are confident
that it works, and then ordering other production models.
The shipyard therefore repeatedly recommends cost type con-
tracts on the first ships of a class, which would alleviate
much of the risk and burden of the above problems.
D. THE NUCLEAR BURDEN
The fact that a ship will be nuclear powered causes them
to fall into a completely separate routine, one that requires
much greater supervision and management. Nuclear propulsion
drawings are the only ones which are non-deviation, meaning
that the builder must build things as in the drawings, even
though they may be wrong in the eyes of the builder. Quali-
fications for laborers are much greater for nuclear powered
vessels. Repetition and detail of testing are also much more
extensive.
Participating in the nuclear testing are the ships' force,
because they are the only licensed operators in the yard.
This provides a fourth set of inspectors , the first being
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the shipyard, the second being the SUPSHIP, the third being
the AEC working for Admiral Rickover directly, and fourth
being the ship's force.
Safety requirements are understandably greater and an
impact on construction management. The thing that most
characterizes a nuclear ship is the lack of compromise. The
rule must be followed to the letter, and there is no excep-
tion. This requirement seems to be demanded without question
in the power stations throughout the country, but perhaps the
excellent record of our nuclear ships has abated the fears




In this chapter, background details pertaining to the
contract for the CGN-38 class ships and the events leading
to the parties entry into court will be explored. First,
emphasis is placed on the roles of the U.S. Navy and Newport
News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company (NNSDCO). Then, addi-
tional information is provided showing the influence of Con-
gress and high officials within the Department of Defense
with respect to this case.
A. OPTION FORMULATION
On June 25, 19 70, the Navy entered into a contract (Con-
tract N00024-70-C-0252 ) with NNSDCO for the preconstruction
preparation necessary for the construction of the nuclear
guided missile frigate, DLGN-38 (later to be designated the
CGN-38). This contract also contained an option, which could
be exercised by the Navy, for the actual construction of the
DLGN-38.
The scope of the initial contract was expanded by con-
tract modifications. These modifications altered the terms
of the original contract and the most significant changes
came with modifications P00007, P00018, P00024 and P00037.
1. Contract Modification P00007
In February 19 71, the Navy went into negotiation with
NNSDCO. The result of the initial negotiation was a decision
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to build five ships of the CGN-38 class. In April 1971,
with orders from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Navy,
in negotiation with NNSDCO
,
proposed to reduce the number
of the CGN-38 class from 5 to 3 . In July 19 71, NNSDCO made
a counter proposal, consisting of 3 ships to be built and
an option (exercisable by the Navy) for 2 more.. Agreement
on this proposal was reached in November 19 71 by both par-
ties .
On November 22, 1971, NNSDCO returned the contract
modification for the above proposal, but included a document
which they claimed was the minutes of the negotiations. The
Navy, upon review of this included document, refused to
finalize the contract because of errors in the supposed min-
utes. NNSDCO agreed to withdraw the document, but the Navy
would not agree to the contract until an affidavit was filed
stating that the document was erroneous. After discussions
between the President of Tenneco and the Navy, NNSDCO agreed
to (and signed) a letter which stated the document was in
error. Copies of these supposed minutes were to have been
destroyed, but NNSDCO later makes reference to these same
documents in arguments of coercion on the part of the Navy.
Contract modification P00007 was executed on December
21, 19 71. By executing this change, the Navy contracted for
the construction of the CGN-38, plus two additional ships
of the class (CGN-39 and 40). In addition, a specification
was included which gave the Navy the option to contract for
two more ships (CGN-Ul and 42). The important specification
is Article 28 of Contract Modification P0000 7. The options
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were to be exercised by February 1, 1973 for the CGN-41 and
by February 1, 19 74 for the CGN-42.
i. Contract Modification P00018
On February 1, 19 73, the Navy and NNSDCO executed
Contract Modification P00018. VJhen this modification was
executed, the Government felt that Article 28 had been amended
such that the option exercise dates for the CGN-Ul and 42
had been extended by two years. One option which the Navy
purported to exercise states:
"On or before 1 February 19 75, the Government, by
modification to this contract, may require the contractor
to construct and deliver CGN-41, but only if the Govern-
ment, by modification to this contract by December 1, 19 73,
authorizes the contractor to expend funds, in an amount of
$29,062,200 for material procurement, shop fabrication,
and other preliminary work."
Details of contract modification P00018 are included in
Exhibit 3.
3. Contract Modification P00021
On November 29, contract modification P00021 was ex-
ecuted. With this modification, the Government maintained
that the delivery dates for DLGN-41 and 42 were extended to
October 19 78 and June 19 79, respectively, in return for an
extension of the date by which the Navy must provide funding
for the preconstruction work on DLGN-41 and 42, in order to
exercise the options for actual construction.
The Navy executed contract modification P00022 on
February 27, 19 74. This modification authorized NNSDCO to
spend $35 million to accomplish the preconstruction work on
the CGN-41. The bulk of this authorization was a prerequi-
site under Article 2 8 of the original contract.
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Contract modification P0002M- was executed by the
Navy on January 31, 19 75. With the execution of this modi-
fication the Navy exercised its option for the construction
of the CGN-41.
B. NAVY-CONTRACTOR RELATIONS
During the first few years of the contract, the Navy and
NNSDCO had a good working relationship, but after contract
modification P00022 was executed, their relationship became
hostile. In December 19 74, NNSDCO submitted to the Navy a
document outlining areas which they felt made the exercising
of the option to construct the CGN-41 and 42 invalid. The
areas presented were:
1. Invalidity of option caused by specification changes
NNSDCO stated that under the original contract, the
CGN-41 and 42 were to be follow ships of the CGN-38
class. Because of the numerous change orders and
constructive changes issued by the Navy to the CGN-
38 through 40 (which had not been applied to the
CGN-41 and 42), the CGN-41 and 42 were no longer fol-
low ships
.
2. Invalidity of option caused by commercial impracti-
cability. NNSDCO stated that because of market con-
ditions, material shortages, severe inflation, etc.,
performance of the CGN-41 and 42 contract would en-
tail losses critical to the company and that this
option was unenforceable.
3. Invalidity of option caused by mutual mistake of
fact. NNSDCO stated that both parties were mutually
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mistaken in the assumption that the maximum price of
CGN-41 and 42 would be sufficient considering econom-
ic conditions (i.e., high rate of inflation).
4. Invalidity of option caused by unilateral mistake as
precluding option exercise. NNSDCO stated that an
option is merely a unilateral offer and does not ri-
pen into a contract until accepted. Therefore, the
contractor is entitled to rescind its offer.
5. Invalidity of option caused by unconscionability
.
NNSDCO stated that the present ceiling prices for the
CGN-41 and 42 are ruinously low because of the lift-
ing of price controls and high inflation.
6. Illegality of option provisions because they are in
violation of Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPR). NNSDCO bases their position on the fact
that the ASPR authorizes the Government to prescribe
options only when the prices will not be unfair to
either party and that the contractor would not be
forced to incur undue risks. It now is clear, in
NNSDCO' s opinion, that the criteria for inclusion of
the options were not fulfilled and must be deemed
ineffective
.
7. NNSDCO stated that the illegality of the extension
and exercising of option was that there was no sta-
tutory negotiation authority for the CGN-41 and 42
and it was not supported by a proper DSP; therefore,
the Navy's option rights could not be extended and
the options were invalid.
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8. NNSDCO stated that there was not adequate new legal
consideration to support modifications which exten-
ded option exercise dates.
9. NNSDCO stated that options were unenforceable be-
cause maximum ship prices have been rendered grossly
inadequate because of the economic situation.
10
.
NNSDCO stated that options were indefinite because
numerous changes to conform the CGN-m and 42 to the
CGN-38 (so as to make them follow ships of the class)
had not been made. This resulted in undefinitized
,
unfixed and unknown prices
.
11. NNSDCO stated that existing economic conditions and
material shortages may doom to failure the contract
because of inadequate pricing. Such failure would
be excusable because of factors beyond the control
and without the fault of NNSDCO.
The Government carefully reviewed the NNSDCO document
2
and all 11 allegations , and found no validity to any of
these arguments. There existed an escalation clause to cover
increased costs for material and labor. By definition, the
CGN-41 and 42 were still follow ships of the CGN-38 class.
Even though all changes had not been incorporated into the
CGN-41 and 42, none of these changes significantly altered
the design of the ship.
C. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
Because of the increasing hostility between the Navy and
NNSDCO, a "Memorandum of Understanding" was signed by both
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3parties m February of 19 75. Under this memorandum, both
parties agreed to a cooling-off period during which they
would refrain from initiating any court action. Further,
negotiation was to continue without prejudice to the rights
of either party.
D. RICKOVER ASSESSMENT
Admiral Rickover, in February 1975, assessing the CGN-Ul
negotiations , made the following comments and recommenda-
tions
:
1. The present difficulty with NNSDCO stems from the
fact that they have been able to discuss the problem
with senior Department of Defense personnel and Navy
officials who can apply pressure to the Navy to
settle
.
2. The Navy is in good legal position regarding the op-
tion and should not make any concessions. Any
special consideration given NNSDCO on the CGN-41
could have ramifications on the contract for the
CGN-38, 39, and 40.
3. No notification was given to the Navy prior to
announcing the construction of a new commercial yard.
NNSDCO has assured the Navy in writing that they will
not allow commercial work to interfere with Navy
work, but the assignment of shipyard personnel to
have responsibility in two areas must have an impact.
4. NNSDCO wants to delay the CGN-41 by 19 months and
the CGN-42 by 2 3 months. This could be an attempt
41

on their part to reprice the contract as well as
divert skilled manpower to commercial work.
5. NNSDCO complains of high interest they must pay on
money used to finance Navy work, but as of February
of 1975, NNSDCO had reported costs of $1,471 million
and had been paid $1,408 million.
NNSDCO contention that the option exercise was invalid
did not stop when the Memorandum of Understanding was signed.
Early in April of 19 75, a senior official of NNSDCO sent a
letter to the Navy citing three reasons why the CGN-41 option
was invalid.
1. The option exercise is prohibited by the Anti-Defi-
'
. ciency Acts . NNSDCO contended that the monies appro-
priated in the 19 75 budget were not sufficient to
cover the ceiling cost of the CGN-41 contract and
DoD had granted a waiver for full funding and NNSDCO
cannot proceed until it is guaranteed of full fund-
ing.
2. The option exercise was not authorized by the 19 75
Appropriations Act. NNSDCO contends that the CGN-Ul
is not a follow ship to the CGN-38 class because of
substantial changes that had not been incorporated,
but to incorporate these changes would require NNSDCO
to make new designs at a substantial cost.
3. The option exercise is prohibited by ASPR. NNSDCO
contends that because, in their estimation the pro-




The Navy, in response to these allegations, once again
stated that the option to build the CGN-41 was valid. The
Navy stated that sufficient funds had been appropriated for
the obligations under contract. The CGN-Ul and 42 have the
same basic characteristics of the CGN-38.
E. NAVY ANALYSIS
In addition, the Navy prepared an analysis of the CGN-Ul
case for the Under Secretary of the Navy, which reviewed the
debate on the validity of the option plus the major points
of a new NNSDCO proposal. The major point of this new pro-
posal was the change in the delivery dates for the CGN-M-l and
42, which was to delay the delivery by 19 and 2 3 months,
respectively. The analysis of the situation was as follows:
1. NNSDCO contends that delays are due to problems with
contractor furnished equipment. The NAVSEA negotia-
tors have concluded that NNSDCO has not taken reason-
able action to procure machinery components on a
minimum schedule and the responsibility lies with
NNSDCO to take aggressive action to minimize the im-
pact on cost and schedule.
2. To avoid problems in building the CGN-41 and 42 on
contract schedule, continue Navy work in progress,
contract for future cost type overhaul work, and de-
liver commercial work on schedule, NNSDCO must reverse
decreasing manpower levels and build up from 18,000
to 22,000 direct labor personnel. NNSDCO, by delaying
the work on the CGN-41 and 42, would eliminate need
43

for 1000 to 1500 direct labor personnel in the criti-
cal period of 1976 and early 1977. If NNSDCO post-
pones the delivery of the CGN-41 and 42 to their pro-
posed dates , this would reduce manpower buildup re-
quired to make manpower available for commercial work
through the critical period, plus guaranteeing work
in the 19 7 8 to 19 80 time frame.
NNSDCO has repeatedly contended that they would suf-
fer large losses if the CGN-Ul and 42 were built ac-
cording to the contract, but have never submitted
any documented proof. According to Navy estimates,
they stand to make a $4 million profit under contract
with their proposed delivery dates.
Answers were also provided for specific allegations
made by NNSDCO:
a. NNSDCO alleged that the Navy's delay in authoriz-
ing them to expend funds for long lead time pro-
curement impacted on their ability to procure
these items. According to the Navy, extensions
on these dates were agreed to by bilateral con-
tractual agreement and funds were provided by the
Navy on the dates specified.
b. NNSDCO alleged that they could not extend their
vendor options as it did not have funding autho-
rization from the Navy. The Navy stated that
these options were originally obtained without
funding authorization and NNSDCO could have of-
fered extension in delivery dates , as well as
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escalation coverage, as the Navy did with
NNSDCO.
c, NNSDCO alleged that in early 197U the Navy was
informed of problems in procuring long lead time
material and had been asked for assistance, but
had not responded. The Navy stated that they
had been informed of increasing prices and of
vendors refusing to honor option exercises, but
had not been informed of the problem of obtaining
material in time to complete construction to the
contract date.
F. THE AEGIS OUT
In May 19 75, because of the position taken by NNSDCO in
regards to the option for the CGN-41 and 42 , the Under Secre-
tary of Defense requested that the Navy study the possibility
of delaying both the CGN-Ul and 42 until the AEGIS weapon
system was available for fleet use. Though this would not
eliminate the whole problem, the Chief of Naval Operations
recommended that both ships continue to be built as original-
ly configured. In the Congress, the Senate Armed Services
Committee voted to delay the CGN-42 until the AEGIS system
was available, while the House Armed Services Committee voted
to continue with the CGN-U2 as planned. Admiral Rickover
presented his position for building the CGN-41 and 42 as
7planned m the following arguments:
1. By 1981, there will be 4 nuclear aircraft carriers
and only 10 nuclear powered missile ships, including
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the CGN-42. The weapons system for the CGN-38 class
is superior to existing systems, when the AEGIS wea-
pon system reaches the fleet, it will enhance the
capability of the CGN-38 class weapon system.
2. It is not the intention of the Navy, to the best of
his knowledge, to include AEGIS on all carrier es-
corts, but rather on 2 escorts per carrier. These
escorts would be used in conjunction with other exist-
ing missile ships for good defense. Therefore,
the Navy may wish to use the CGN-38 class as config-
ured throughout their lives or in later years moder-
nize the CGN-38 class with the AEGIS system under a
modernization program. Studies have shown that money
can be saved by building now what is under contract
and modifying later rather than to delay until devel-
opment is complete.
3. If the CGN-42 is delayed to allow incorporation of
the AEGIS system, it is possible that funding will
be lost and this could in effect cause the loss of
the CGN-42.
M- . If the Navy now says that building the CGN-42 as pres-
ently configured is no longer valid, then the CGN-M-1
may come under attack and be deferred also because
the keel has not yet been laid down. Thus, it is
quite possible that the Navy could lose both the CGN-
41 and 42.
5. During the period FY'63 through FY'7B, only 7 new fleet
air defense ships (nuclear or non-nuclear) have been
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approved. The CGN-36 to CGN-i42 and the Navy should
not take any actions which may jeopardize any of them.
G. THE NAVY'S MAXIMUM POSITION
In the last part of May 19 75, the Navy outlined its maxi-
o
mum acceptable position in regard to the CGN-41 and 42. In
this, the Navy set a ceiling price of $100 million for the
CGN-41 and $99 million for the CGN-42 . The Navy had developed
their maximum position from data submitted from NNSDCO. The
details of the Navy's position are shown in Exhibit U.
H. MAXIMUM SHIPYARD POSITION
In June 1975, a representative of NNSDCO went to Washing-
ton and met with a member of the Navy's contracting officer's
staff to further discuss the CGN-41 contract, hoping to per-
suade the Navy to change their position. NNSDCO representa-
tive pointed out that the number of shipyards in the United
States capable of building nuclear powered ships had dropped
from 7 to 2 . He then made the following points, emphasizing
that NNSDCO would not build a ship at a loss:
1. NNSDCO wanted to change the delivery date for the CGN-
41 from October 1978 to May 1980. This extension is
due to the failure to achieve option dates because
of the Navy's failure to resolve baseline technical
problems which delayed placing long lead time items
under contract in timely fashion.
2. NNSDCO required that the ceiling price be raised to
$125 million from $100 million. This would not
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include any escalation provisions , but would include
all changes and a release to date from claims.
3. NNSDCO required that escalation coverage extend to
new delivery date with billing to new ceiling.
4. NNSDCO wanted the CGN-42 to be subject to separate
pricing action.
5. NNSDCO does not recognize the option to build the
CGN-Ul and 42 , but wants a separate contract for these
ships. They do not recognize the Navy delivery needs
and are unwilling to accept any responsibility for
higher prices. They further stated that "NNSDCO will
not accept any work that will not put them into the
black."
6. The NNSDCO representative stated that if agreement
cannot be reached on the CGN-41 (and 42 if approved
by Congress), NNSDCO may not build the ships, and if
Mr. Freeman (President of Tenneco) has his way,
NNSDCO will withdraw its offer on SSN-688 procurement.
In addition, NNSDCO may pull its men off all other
Navy work, including CVAN and would fight by legal
means if forced to do work.
I. CGN-41 WORK SUSPENDED
Late in August of 19 75, NNSDCO informed the Navy that the
maximum acceptable position put forth by the Navy would cause
a $38 million loss for NNSDCO and that NNSDCO was under no




1. Adequate funds were not appropriated to effectively
exercise option on the CGN-41.
2. Ship specifications have not been kept up to date,
so CGN-41 is not a follow ship.
3. Issues such as commercial impracticability still
have not been resolved.
4. The impact of the construction program for the CGN-
38, 39 and 40 have not been contractually reflected
on the CGN-141.
It was further asserted that, even if the option were
valid and enforcable, the maximum acceptable position did not
recognize NNSDCO's contractual rights concerning vessel de-
livery dates, escalation, changes in law and other matters.
In addition, the Memorandum of Understanding was cancelled
and all long lead time procurement and other work pursuant
to the CGN-M-l were suspended.
49

V. CGN-41 IN COURT
This Chapter provides the details of the CGN-M-1 court
case and in particular, the evolvement of the division with-
in the Government resulting in the appointment of Mr. Gordon
Rule.
A. ENTERING COURT AGREEMENTS
On 27 August 1975, Newport News halted all work on the
CGN-Ul. On 29 August 1975, the Navy (represented by the
Justice Department) filed suit in the U. S. District Court
for Eastern Virginia, Newport News Division, seeking a pre-
liminary injunction and a temporary restraining order to
order Newport News back to work on the CGN-41.
The position presented by Newport News before the court
was that the option was invalid for the following reasons:
1. There were insufficient appropriations, which was
a contravention of 41 USC 11(a), 31 USC 11 665(a)
and the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR)
2. The Navy had failed to notify the Shipyard of the
specifications for the CGN-M-1.
3. Under various legal theories, the option was unen-
forceable, e.g., commercial impracticality
.
In court on that same day, Newport News suggested and the
Navy agreed to an arrangement whereby for one year, unless
terminated by either party giving prior notice, Newport News
agreed to continue work on the CGN-41 and the Navy agreed to
50

pay for work done under this agreement on a cost plus 7% fee
basis. During this period, both parties further agreed to
negotiate in good faith to settle the option controversy and
to seek an expeditious opinion from the Comptroller General
on the question of insufficient appropriations previously
submitted by Newport News. Both parties asked the court to
allow this argument to be read into the record of the court
as an Order of the Court. The Court, "believing that all
good faith attempts to reach settlement should be encouraged,"'
agreed. In the court's opinion, this order by the court
mooted the temporary restraining order issue and stayed the
judicial proceedings. It was directed that Newport News im-
mediately resume preconstruction work and proceed to under-
take construction of the CGN-41. All changes heretofore made
in the specifications for the earlier CGN-38, 39, and 40 were
to be considered as incorporated into the specifications for
CGN-Ul and the parties agreed to negotiate in good faith the
appropriate equitable adjustments for all specification
changes
.
Important to the case was the language of this agreement
where the parties agreed to "negotiate in good faith to
reach an agreement as rapidly as possible to modify those
contract provisions requiring amendment or to take other ap-
3propriate actions." At the day of the agreement, Mr.
Jeffery Axelead (representing the United States and the De-
partment of Justice) stipulated to the Court that E. Gray
Lewis (the Navy's General Counsel) would "undertake to ensure
the Navy's obligation" to negotiate under the court order.
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B. TO NEGOTIATE OR NOT TO NEGOTIATE
On 29 October, Mr. Lewis was ordered by higher Navy offi-
cials to stop all negotiations. On 30 October the Acting
Commander, NAVSEA, formally recommended to the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics) that the
Navy amend its complaint before the Court and obtain a ruling
on the option validity. He stated that he considered any de-
lay to be disadvantageous to the Navy and that inaction would
leave the Navy open to charges of acquiescence to intentions
to delay delivery of the ship. In NAVSEA' s opinion, Newport
News had not changed their position that new contract terms
and conditions were required. He stated further that, "There
is no basis to modify the maximum Navy position of the May 28,
1975 letter to Newport News. The Navy has a good case and
4further delay will obscure the situation."
C. CGN-41 STEERING GROUP
On 31 October 1975, the Under Secretary of the Navy (ISL)
established a CGN-41 steering group to oversee the negotia-
tions. Members included the Under Secretary of the Navy,
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ISL), the Chief of Naval
Material, the General Counsel of the Navy, the Commander,
Naval Sea Systems Command, and Admiral Rickover. Rear Admi-
ral S. J. Evans, the Deputy Chief of Naval Material was
appointed head of the Navy's negotiating team.
Admiral Evans' charter included the following objectives:
(a) Comply with the spirit and letter of the District
Court Order of 29 August 1975.
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Cb) Negotiate to achieve construction of the CGN-41 in
accordance with the terms of the contract between
the Navy Department and Newport News , including such
modifications required by the terms or otherwise
authorized by law or Armed Services Procurement Regu-
lations .
(c) Achieve resolution of outstanding issues of the CGN-
41 option between the Navy and Newport News at the
earliest practical date.
(d) Obtain stipulation by Newport News of CGN-41 option
validity under any settlement achieved (pursuant to
(a) above )
.
(e) (Concurrent with good faith negotiations under (a)
above) assure that all necessary and proper arrange-
ments have been made to pursue the CGN-41 controversy
in the appropriate legal form, as may be in the best
interest of the Navy.
D. TO DECIDE NOW
18 November 1975, Admiral Evans recommended that the Navy
request that the Justice Department file papers to obtain the
Court's ruling on the validity of the CGN-Ul contract. The
recommendation was disapproved by the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (I&L), who, in a memorandum to Admiral Evans on 19
November stated that the timing was "inappropriate now," that
a good atmosphere was needed for negotiations as required by




In February 1976, Newport News had submitted several new
claims. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Clements, subse-
quently instructed the Navy within 3 days to come up with a
plan that would both improve relations with the shipbuilder
7
and resolve outstanding disputes
^
E. RULE ENTERS
Also, on 3 October, Mr. Gordon Rule, head of the Pro-
curement Control on Clearance Division within the Naval Mate-
rial Command, made a speech alleging misbehavior on the part
of many high level civilians and military in the Department
of Defense, calling for those involved in major procurement
to be summoned before Congress and required to testify under
oath. Most notably, he also recommended that Admiral Rick-
over be kept on active duty, "no matter what anyone thinks
o
of him, (he) knows what he is doing and does it well."
On M- March 1976, Gordon W, Rule signed a document which
appeared in the Shipbuilder's Council of America Newsletter,
in a letter from J. P. Diesel to Congressman Downing, and
ultimately in the Congressional Record for 18 March 1976.
The major question posed- by this Article, "Navy Shipbuilders
of America" was: Where will the Navy find the shipbuilding
capacity to produce our known requirements for ships , when
we have no mobilization base in the United States for Navy
shipbuilding? Mr. Rule feels that the Navy plays games and
places ships in predetermined yards under the guise of com-
petition. He also points out that, prior to 1963, the Navy
had allocated ship construction to keep yards busy, but that




The minor premise of this article was that, if the capa-
city could have been found, under what terms and conditions
would it be available to the Navy. Mr. Rule felt that it
was necessary that the Navy not use the Defense Production
Act and that the shipbuilding industry be assured of fair
contracts and treatment by the Navy and of a reasonable op-
portunity to earn a good profit.
Mr. Rule also identified the following points to under-
stand in dealing with the shipbuilding problem:





Concurrent development leads to changes.
(c) When the Navy utilizes lead/follow yard methods,
claims and delays are inherent.
(d) Shipbuilding labor is 30-35% nonproductive or in-
efficient .
(e) The Navy makes unfair contracts for building the
ships it requires and industry knows this.
(f) Unfair contracts leads to claims.
(g) A review of Claims and Requests for Equitable Ad-
justment indicates that the Navy is not learning.
(h) That the Navy went to court against Newport News
and was told to negotiate differences.
Mr. Rule went further in recommending a short term goal
of settlement of the outstanding Litton and Newport News
claims, but more important for the long run goal, it was
his feeling that the Navy must change from the firm fixed
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price, FFP, and firm fixed price plus incentive fee, FFPI,
contracts. Other specific recommendations were: (a) the
return of allocations to private yards, (b) creditable tar-
get prices, which had a 50/50 chance of being met, and (c)
that lead ships be started on a cost-no-fee contract to be
later definitized to a FPI contract.
Admiral Rickover has stated that these arguments by Mr.
Rule set the tone for subsequent contentions of shipbuilders
and Senior Defense Officials that Navy contracts were unfair
On 22 March 1976, Gordon W. Rule issued an addition to
his 4 March article in which he included the statements of
Newport News President Diesel and General Dynamics Electric
Boat Division President, Mr. Pierce. Mr. Diesel stated that
the Navy's primary problem was whether or not there was goin;
to be a private sector to do the Navy's shipbuilding. Mr.
Pierce was quoted to the effect that things had gotten worse
since Electric Boat had chosen nuclear submarines as their
only work and that they were not going to let the Navy run
their businesses.
To eliminate claims. Rule again recommended the two-step
contract procedure where he felt pricing problems would be
forced to the foreground and not left to later controversy.
After pointing to the manpower diverted to negotiation of
claims, he proposed full pricing at issuance of all change




F. MR. CLEMENTS AND P.L. 85-804
On 24 March 1976 DEPSECDEF Clements received a presenta-
tion by the Navy on a plan to resolve the dispute with New-
port News. Admiral Rickover has testified to Congress that
Navy representatives had concluded that there was no quick
way to settle claims in accordance with the contract terms.
However, just prior to this presentation, Senior Navy Offi-
cials decided to present only alternatives , with no recommen-
dations. One of these alternatives was the use of Public Law
85-804. Admiral Rickover felt strongly against this decision,
insisted on putting his recommendations in writing, and pre-
sented them directly to the Deputy Secretary Clements . De-
spite Admiral Rickover' s strong protest, Mr. Clements chose
to attempt resolution through P.L. 85-804.
In a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Material on 2 9
March, Rule stated support for a Deputy Secretary of Defense
Clements decision to utilize PL 85-804 to erase the $1.7
billion in claims of Electric Boat, Litton and Newport News.
He stated that $1,097 billion were for nuclear ships and pre-
dicted a "head to head" confrontation with Admiral Rickover.
He recommended that lawyers be included in meetings on this
issue and that whoever was to lead the group should not have
had any past experience with the yards in question.
On 30 March 1976, DEPSECDEF Clements, after stating that
the status of shipbuilding was unsatisfactory and describing
an atmosphere of sharp litigation and mutual distrust, de-
clared that PL 85-804 must be used. To accomplish this, he
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established the Shipbuilding and Executive Committee comprised
of ASD(I£L), ASD (Legal Affairs), the General Council of DoD,
ASN (Financial Management), CNM, and COMNAVSEA. Noticeably
9
absent was Admiral Rickover.
G. ADM. RICKOVER VS. MR. RULE
On 28 April 1976, Admiral Rickover submitted a memorandum
to the CNM in reply to Rules' Article of 29 March in which
he stated that:
1. Gordon Rule had failed to mention items of contractor
responsibility that caused cost increases, increased
overhead rates, lower productivity, inadequate man-
ning, and construction errors.
2. Escalation provisions and progress payments are more
liberal in shipbuilding contracts than in any other
defense contracts, and in addition, the Navy takes
responsibility for many of the high risk items through
the providing of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE).
3. There is mutual agreement on type of contract, de-
livery dates, and target costs, and that Mr. Rule had
sat in on these negotiations and reviewed all of the
contracts
.
4. The contractor was well protected by the escalation
clause as long as he worked within the contract de-
livery date and ceiling price.
5. It takes time to evaluate and negotiate. Navy procure-
ment directives require that the contractor certify
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that a claim is current, complete and accurate.
Newport News refused to do this.
6. The bulk $665 million of the Newport News claim for
$894 million had only been submitted within the last
year.
7. A cost-no-fee contract would put the Navy in a bad
bargaining position.
8. Gordon Rule recommended excusing shipbuilders on the
basis of poor Navy procurement practices on contracts
which ignored the fact that some shipbuilders have
been unwilling to settle claims on the basis of legal
entitlement
.
On 14 April 1976, Gordon Rule listed the following as
causes of the Navy problems.
1. Price competition for warships.
2. Forward pricing of fixed price contracts.
3. Use of unrealistic delivery dates.
4. Misjudging the economic impact of normal and abnormal
inflation on ship contracts.
5. Wrong types of contracts.
6. An unfair matrix of contracts.
7. Unfair and inappropriate escalation clauses.
8. Contracting to meet budget estimates.
9. Late Government furnished equipment and information
(GFE and GFI).
10. Failure of the Navy to properly recognize a nation-
wide shortage of a shipbuilding labor force.
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Rule's recommendations for improvements to be incorporated in
future relations included:
1. Realistically assessing the risk involved in concur-
rent development and production and discontinuing the
use of fixed price contracts where they had proven
to be unrealistic, imprudent, and claim producing.
2. Allocation of shipbuilding and overhauls.
3. Building lead ships under cost type contracts.
4. Not contracting for a class of ships until one or two
had been built.
5. Allocating work on a cost contract and on a specified
date converting to a fixed contract for follow on
work.
6. Requesting from Congress, at the outset, additional
funds when required, rather than waiting.
7. Establishing a 50/50 chance target cost.
8. Doing away with unilateral changes.
In a letter to United States Congressman Melvin Price,
dated 10 May 1976, Mr. Rule stated that the situation required
"surgery, not treatment" and that the claims were not the
problem but rather a result of the problem. In this letter
he outlined a three step following for solving the problem:
1. Use of 85-804, as recommended by DEPSECDEF Clements,
to eliminate the existing claims.
2. Reestablishment of mutual respect between the con-
tractors and the Navy.
3. Use of fair shipbuilding contracts.
60

Mr. Rule also stated that the major roadblock was Admiral
Rickover, whom he felt was unwilling to accept a decision
from a superior. He further stated that Rickover should have
been removed from all contractual matters , remaining in a
technical consultant position only.
H. MORE PRESSURE
14 June 1976, Newport News formally advised the DEPSECDEF
that it considered that the Navy had breached its contract
option for construction of the CVN-70 VINSON. Similar to the
CGN-M-1 case, this option was part of the original CVN-68-69
contract. Terms of this contract were to be definitized by
December 1974, but as of 5 July 1976, Newport News felt that
no action had been taken; therefore, they intended to stop
work on the CVN-70. Litton then notified the Navy that they
intended to stop work on the LHA project, also holding that
the Navy was in breach of contract.
On 18 June 1976, Newport News Vice President C. E. Dart
wrote to Admiral Hopkins, restating Newport News' desire to
negotiate in good faith but indicating that the Navy had shown
no desire to negotiate. Dart also stated that he felt Admiral
Rickover to be the major stumbling block in negotiations.
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VI. THE RULE DECISION
A. RULES APPOINTMENT
On July 13, 1976, the Shipyard instituted a motion before
the Federal District Court. In an effort to enforce the Agree-
ment of 29 August 1975, Newport News asked that the court sus-
pend the shipyard's obligation to continue work on DLGN-41.
Also on that day, a meeting was held in DEPSECDEF Clements'
office at which Gordon Rule was present. The Court later
found as fact, based on argument before the Court again that
same day, that at that time Gordon Rule was appointed by the
DEPSECDEF as Chief Negotiator for the CLGN-Ul dispute, with
authority to bind the United States to a compromise agreement.
It was also the Court's opinion that this was a direct re-
sponse to Newport News' filing on 13 July 1976.
Deputy Secretary Clements instructed Rule that he wanted
to see four items negotiated in any CLGN-M-l compromise agree-
ment :
(a) A new escalation clause
(b) A new "changes in the law clause"
(c) A new ceiling price
(d) A new delivery schedule.
Clements instructed that he was to be informed daily, in de-
tail, of the progress to compromise.
Newport News interpreted Rule's appointment as the Navy's
intention to negotiate in good faith and on 16 July 1976 re-
quested the court stay action on its 13 July motion.
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B. RULE'S ASSESSMENT: WHAT WAS NEEDED
In a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Material on 1 Sep-
tember, Gordon Rule gave a detailed description of his side
of the issue. He stated that he had had no involvement with
the CLGN-Ul issue prior to being assigned negotiator, but,
after preparing himself by reading all records and correspon-
dence, that he could not help but conclude that "this record
is almost beyond belief in vindictiveness , arrogance, harass-
2
ment and bias on the part of certain Navy representatives."
Mr. Rule felt that, "the Navy and Newport News were so
dug into their respective positions that there literally,
in my (Rule's) opinion, was no way they could be reconciled
at this point in time except through infusion of some new
faces to carry out the Court order." From the outset of
negotiations. Rule felt that a rapid settlement was necessary
and that negotiations could not deal only with those eight
items in the contract modification P00018. The eight items
referred to are shown in Exhibit 5. A realistic delivery
date, and a realistic escalation schedule reflecting that
date, were set as his key objectives.
C. RULE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE AGREEMENT
The resultant agreement could be characterized by the
following elements, according to Mr. Rule:
1. The cost envelope in Modification P00018, i.e., tar-




2. The new delivery date set for the CGN-M-l was August
1980.
3. The escalation clause was the same as that to be in-
cluded in the new SSN711 contract and was effective
through August 19 80.
4. The escalation clause did not include a Newport News
request for escalation payments on base costs over
ceiling.
5. The agreement rejected a Newport News request for
105% progress payments for the first 50% of comple-
tion rather than the normal 100%.
6. There was agreement to 100% compensation for indirect
costs
.
7. Newport News agreed to waive all claims for delay and
disruption costs in the CGN-M-l delivery schedule re-
sulting from or incident to any or all events , includ-
ing Government actions or inactions occurring before
the agreement date,
8. The Navy agreed to pay compensation for the cost
growth experienced by Newport News for fringe bene-
fits, energy costs, and changes in the law. The tar-
get price and ceiling price for this growth were to
be computed on actual expenditures rather than on
fixed expenditure tables, then currently in the con-
tract.




10. A revision of schedule A (GFM) would also be required
to synchronize with the new dates.
11. The agreement did not apply to any other contract
changes .
12. The agreement required the Court's approval.
In giving his reason for modifying the CGN-Ul contract,
Mr. Rule stated the several factors that he saw in the case,
which were of great litigative risk to a Court trial settle-
ment on the case merits. They are as follows:
1. It could be shown by a trial that there were impro-
per negotiations of the basic CGN contract by certain




The terms of the CGN and other incentive contracts
negotiated by unauthorized personnel would be shown
in court to be unfair and improper.
3. Certain persons called as witnesses under oath would
be so revealing of a conscious pattern of prejudice
and petty vindictiveness toward the contractor that
the court would not permit those types of actions
and treatment to go unpunished.
4. Threats of retaliation against the contractor, such
as no more business, etc., which threats would have
serious economic effects on the contractor, have
been made and would surely emulate against the'
Government
.
5 There had been a failure to comply with Navy procure-
ment directives in that Mod P00018 had not been
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submitted to the Chief of Naval Material for appro-
val. Had it been submitted, it would not have been
approved due to an unfair shareline of 95/5 for the
first 15% above and below target cost and 90/10
thereafter, whereas, on the original three ships,
the shareline was 80/20.
Rule concluded that he had complied with the Court's or-
der and that his settlement was in the best interest of the
United States. He felt that the Navy and the shipbuilders
should realize that Admiral Rickover must be kept out of






In the short run, the CGN case deals with the develop-
ment of policy in the Department of Defense, composed of
players from a number or organizations. In particular it
involves the deep set values of Admiral Rickover, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Clements, and Mr. Gordon Rule.
In the long run, the case deals with Navy procurement
practice, contracting procedures, and claims settlement.
Here too, it is difficult to focus on one strategy. Sell-
ing of a ship is a collective effort. In particular, it
covers fair contracting practices and application of
limited resources to a complex and unstable environment.
B. CASE SYNOPSIS
NNSDCO and the Navy had a contract for the completion
of three CGN's, with an option clause for two more. Delays
developed in the construction of the original three, which
delayed the execution of the option.
During this period, NNSDCO was attempting to expand and
had taken on several commercial contracts requiring labor
which they could not provide. The Navy work delay and
problems required even more labor, which was unavailable.
The only course remaining was late delivery, and this re-





NNSDCO held that the option for the two additional ships
was not valid and insisted upon a new delivery date and ex-
tension of the escalation clause. The Navy stood fast and,
when NNSDCO ordered work stopped on the CGN-41, the
Navy took the shipyard to court. Secretary Clements and
Gordon Rule joined together and questioned Admiral Rickover's
fairness in dealing with NNSDCO and achieved a negotiated
settlement which was upheld by the court. Admiral Rickover
insisted throughout the proceedings that any negotiation
of the Navy's right to the original dates without compensa-
tion by the shipyard violated the Congress's sole right to
grant relief. The Court chastised the Navy for its failure
to negotiate in good faith and ruled only of the validity
of the Rule settlement and not on the validity of the
original option.
C. CASE DISCUSSION
There are three major milestones in the CGN-Ul case at
which decisions must be made by the student. They are:
1) validity of the option; 2) going to court; and 3) the
settlement. At each of these milestones, the student should
make an assessment as to whether the decision made by the
Navy was the proper one given the information provided in
the case
.
1 . Validity of Option
The Navy executed the option to construct the CGN-41
on 31 January 1975 through contract modification P00024. As
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soon as the Navy exercised its option, NNSDCO brought forth
several points which questioned the validity of the option.
As presented in the text, NNSDCO felt the option was invalid,
while the Navy felt that exercising the option was complete-
ly legal. Each of the points under question will be dis-
cussed here, giving each party's opinion.
a. Invalidity of Option Caused by
Specification Changes
NNSDCO stated that the CGN-41 was not a follow
ship to the CGN-38 class because not all changes made to the
previous ships of the class had been incorporated into the
CGN-Ul. The Navy's position was that, even though not all
of the changes had been incorporated, these changes would
not cause any significant differences in the ship and there-
fore, the CGN-m was a follow ship. (Note: In the authors'
opinion, NNSDCO' s argument is not a valid one because changes
are a fact of life in shipbuilding and follow ships do not
necessarily have the exact same configuration as the lead
ship . )
b. Invalidity of Option Caused by Commercial
Impracticability
NNSDCO contends that it would suffer critical
losses if required to build the CGN-41, but never revealed
the actual figures showing this fact. Navy analysis showed
that NNSDCO could make a profit under the provisions of the
contract. Furthermore, the escalation clause covered in-
creases in labor and material.




NNSDCO alleged that both parties were mutually
mistaken in assuming that the- accepted maximum price would
be sufficient, given the economic conditions. The Navy
position was that the escalation clause would absorb in-
creasing labor and material costs.
d. Invalidity of Option Caused by Unilateral
Mistake as Precluding Option Exercise
NNSDCO 's position was that the option was a uni-
lateral offer until accepted by the other party. The option
was included as part of the original contract, which was
accepted by NNSDCO.
e. Invalidity of Option Caused by Unconscionability
NNSDCO contended that ceiling prices were ruin-
ously low because of economic conditions. Once again, the
escalation clause relieves this issue.
f. Illegality of Option Provision Because
it is in Violation of ASPR
NNSDCO' s position is based upon the ASPR regula-
tion that requires prices to be fair and stipulating that
no undue risks were to exist for either party. The Navy's
position was that the price was fair and that the escalation
clause reduced the risk on the contractor.
g. Illegality Because of Lacking Negotiating
Authority
NNSDCO stated that there was neither statutory
negotiation authority nor supporting D8P. The Navy's posi-




h. Invalidity Due to Insufficient Consideration
NNSDCO sjated that there was no adequate new
legal consideration to support modification extending option
exercise dates. The Navy contended that this was not neces-
sary, because NNSDCO had been given funds to cover extension.
i. NNSDCO contended that maximum ship prices were
too low because of economic conditions. Once again, the
Navy rebutted that the escalation clause covered increasing
costs of labor and material.
j. NNSDCO stated that, because not all changes had
been incorporated, the result was one of undefinitized , un-
fixed, and unknown prices. It is common practice, whenever
a change is proposed on a ship design, to negotiate the cost
of that change. This case is no different from any other-
shipbuilding contract.
k. NNSDCO predicted doom for the contract because
of inadequate pricing due to the economic conditions . Once
again, it was contended that the escalation clause protected
the contractors against rising costs in labor and material.
It is the opinion of the authors that this
attempt by NNSDCO to have the option ruled invalid was an
attempt to divert from the real issue. It is the authors'
opinion that the option was legal and valid and that NNSDCO
did not want to build the ship because of a lack of capa-
bility at that time due to other commitments , namely commer-
cial business. However, the authors also note that, had the
option not been executed (a very likely event), and had
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NNSDCo not had the commercial contracts , the shipyard would
have had serious losses due to a lack of work.
2 . Going to Court
On 2 7 August 1975, when NNSDCO discontinued work on
the CGN-41, the Navy took NNSDCO to court. The decision at
that point was whether to seek a decision on the validity
of the option or to negotiate. There appears to be two sides
to this issue.
a. In the opinion of NAVSEA and Admiral Rickover,
there was no legal basis to modification of the original con-
tract. The CGN contract did not stand alone; rewriting the
option would have opened the door to many other contracts.
Neither party had changed from its earlier final positions.
b. Deputy Secretary Clements and Assistant Secretary
of the Navy Bowers sought to restore business relations be-
tween the two parties. The relationship between the two had
deteriorated to the point that there occurred alleged threats
of not giving and not accepting future Navy contracts. It
was apparent that NNSDCO would take a loss on the produc-
tion of the CGN-Ul. Private industries, such as oil compa-
nies, were granting contract changes without compensation,
in recognition of the escalation and scarcity of material
during this period.
It is the conclusion of the authors that the Navy
could not legally yield and, therefore, should have sought a
ruling on the validity of the option. In the interest of the
country, P.L. 85-804 could have been applied and would have
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been the proper remedy. Had the Court ruled against the op-
tion, the negotiation of the settlement might not have been
different from the final outcome.
3. The Settlement
It must be pointed out that the validity of the op-
tion was never resolved. The validity of the settlement made
by Mr. Gordon Rule was ruled on and upheld. Here, the ques-
tion is whether or not the settlement should be contested in
an Appellate Court.
a. Gordon Rule had a warrant and he made an agree-
ment under that warrant which was legally binding on the
United States. NNSDCO agreed to it in good faith. This
agreement was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
It was fair in that claims were dropped in return for changes
in delivery dates and escalation clauses.
b. Gordon Rule signed a document and delivered it
in direct disobedience of his superiors. The Navy was il-
legally committed to a course of action which was itself
illegal. The Navy did not agree to the validity of the
claims and could not have received any consideration for the
increased costs. Only the Congress can renegotiate a con-
tract which does not exchange equal benefit to the Govern-
ment. This case sets a bad precedent for other contracts.
The settlement reached by Mr. Gordon Rule with New-
port News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company was appealed by
the Government to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in





upheld in the Federal District Court of Eastern Vir-
ginia. In an article in the Wall Street Journal, dated
March 2, 19 78, it was reported that the Appeals Court had
reversed the District Court's ruling because the parties
negotiators did not settle the case orally and the Attorney
General, whose approval was essential, rejected the terms
that were ultimately reduced to writing.
The reversal sends the case back to Federal District
Court for further proceedings . The Appeals Court declared
that the lower courts finding that the Navy did not nego-
tiate in good faith was inappropriate. In the Appeal Court's
opinion the critical question was whether the oral agreement
was binding, and they ruled that it was not binding.
D. LONG TERM PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Discussion
In addition to the immediate problems posed by the
CGN-41 case, there are several long range issues which the
student should discover. This section is presented to offer
the instructor additional information in guiding the discus-
sion on these issues.
Long term issues, which were illuminated by the CGN-
41 case, consist of fair pricing and scheduling, stability
in the shipbuilding industry, maintenance of the industrial
base, escalation provisions, and the type of contract to be
used in ship procurement.
2. Issues Pertinent to Case
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a. Fair Pricing and Scheduling
One of the NNSDCO's major points throughout the
CGN-Ul dispute was that the maximum price for the ship was
ruinously low. To further emphasize this point, the Ship-
builders' Council of America, in a 1974 report, stated that
the Navy foregoes realism in forward pricing in order to
sell its programs. In testimony before a subcommittee for
the House of Representatives' Committee on Appropriations in
1977, NNSDCO officials stated that there have been overly
optimistic estimates of ships' costs provided by the Navy in
the past. This Committee, during this same period, serious-
ly questioned the Navy on the manner in which they estimate
the cost of ships. The Navy was accused of requesting fund-
ing from Congress for the construction of complex ships be-
fore they are designed. When requesting funding, the cost
estimates are based on a class F (ball park) estimate or a
class D (feasibility estimates due to insufficient design,
production, or cost information) estimate. In 1969, the Navy
did a study to determine the accuracy of class D and F esti-
mates and found that they were about 2 percent below actual
costs. The Navy has requested funds for the FFG-7 class,
Trident submarine, and DDG-47 destroyer (among others) using
2
either a class D or F estimate. Both Congress and the
President have directed the Navy to provide class C estimates
in the future. A class C estimate is budget quality.




Shipbuilders have stated before Congressional
committees that the Navy imposes unrealistic delivery dates
on contractors and that this is a major cause of cost
growth. The Navy rebuts this with the fact that, at con-
tract award, the delivery dates are mutually agreed upon by
both parties. When Mr. Clements was Deputy Secretary of
Defense, in a letter to the Shipbuilder's Council, he warned
that, before entering into a contract, contractors should
carefully review the proposed delivery schedule and weigh
3this against their projected ability to perform.
b. Stability
Shipbuilders have repeatedly stated before Con-
gress that the lack of a national long-range shipbuilding
program has hampered their efforts. Because of the year to
year uncertainty in the volume of work, there is really very
little incentive for capital investment to upgrade facili-
ties. Additionally, the lack of stability has an adverse
effect on labor. Turnover rates for the shipbuilding indus-
try have averaged approximately 40 percent and in some
4trades, it has reached as high as 70 percent.
The uncertainty perceived by shipbuilders is a
result of many factors: changing needs of the Navy due to
changing threats and changing leadership; reassessment by
senior DoD officials and the President; and Congressional
influence. These factors were vividly described in the case
of the AEGIS debate. In the case of the CGN-41, it is quite
possible that NNSDCO concluded that the probabilities that
Congress would approve the CGN-41 and that the Navy would
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exercise the option were very low. Following this hypothe-
sis, it was good business for NNSDCO to pursue commercial
contracts which would stabilize their workload during a
period of low activity with respect to Navy business. When
the Navy exercised its option, NNSDCO was left in a very un-
tenable position since they did not have the capability to
perform both the commercial and Navy work under the terms
laid out in the contracts. If you follow this premise to
this point, it is no wonder that NNSDCO attempted vigorous-
ly to avoid the CGN-41 (or to at least have the delivery
date extended), so that they would not incur any penalties
on commercial work.
Another area where the contractor is affected
by the unstable nature of Navy shipbuilding is in work force
planning and utilization. Mr. Diesel, in testimony before
Congress in 1974, stated that trade skills in quantity are
extremely costly to the shipbuilder. When the backlog is
down, the skilled forces must be reduced. When the backlog
builds up, long training programs are required to increase
the skills of new replacements to an acceptable level. The
impact is also on the worker himself. Due to the uncertain-
ty in constant employment, many workers leave to find more
permanent employment. Another factor is the wage differen-
tial between shipbuilders and other construction industries
which induced skilled workers to leave shipbuilding. The
Navy contends that the shipyard problems are due to a drop
in productivity, but this can be attributed to the high
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turnover and fluctuation in the number of workers, which is
again due to changing shipyard workload,
c. Industrial Base Maintenance
It has been well documented how the number of
shipyards engaged in Navy shipbuilding has dwindled in the
last 10 years, but another factor, just as important, is
that the number of suppliers to the shipyards has also de-
creased. Part of the cause of this deterioration of an over-
all industrial base is the constant turmoil of Navy procure-
ment. The necessary industrial base will be determined by
the size of the fleet required by the Navy and the number
of shipbuilders who actively engage in shipbuilding and
still make a profit with consistency. .
This case deals with NNSDCO, which presently is
the only shipyard capable of building nuclear surface ships.
Because of the small number of nuclear surface ships being
requested at this time, one shipyard is sufficient, but if
the decision were made to increase our surface nuclear fleet,
the capability would not be there. Realistically, because
of the high cost of these vessels, it is doubtful that any
significant increase will occur. However, another argument
is that (because of the specialized skills required) it would
be difficult to sustain very many yards at a level to pro-
perly utilize the manpower.
Another aspect of this problem is that the com-
mercial shipbuilding industry does not provide a sufficient
workload to alleviate the fluctuations in Navy shipbuilding.
78

If the commercial shipbuilding industry in the United States
were bigger, changes in Navy shipbuilding requirements would
not have such a large impact. The manpower levels could be
more constant with a more constant workload. The aerospace
industry in the United States is a good example of an indus-
try which can better adapt to fluctuations in military pro-
curement because they have a much larger commercial base.
Because of the dollar value of the military aircraft purchases,
attempts have been made to apply "successful" management tech-
niques from this industry to the shipbuilding, ignoring the
fundamental difference.
The more immediate problem is the loss of the
suppliers. By having fewer qualified suppliers, the competi-
tion is reduced and prices go up. More competition at this
level could and should be generated to ensure a quality
product at a reasonable price. Industry has contended that,
because of Navy control, many suppliers refuse to do business
with the shipyards.
d. Escalation Provisions
Shipbuilders have alleged that escalation clauses
have been inadequate in the past. Prior to 1975, escalation
was based on the contract delivery date and the ceiling price.
To determine the amount paid, indices were developed from
the Bureau of Labor statistics. Therefore, if the contractor
was unable to complete the work by the delivery date speci-




Admiral Rickover, in testimony before Congress
in 1974, stated that shipbuilders generally do not receive
escalation payments if they exceed the target cost or delay
delivery when these increased costs or delays are not the
fault of the Government.
J. P. Diesel stated, during these same hearings,
that the shipbuilders are exposed to all the risks of infla-
tion if the target cost is exceeded. In comparing the
private and public sector, he stated that in the private
sector, either the price of an item is determined at the
time of delivery, or the seller is allowed to include his
own best estimate of the effect of inflation on his selling
price. Neither of these options is available when dealing
with the Government; instead, the target and ceiling prices
are set years in advance of delivery.
Beginning with contracts awarded in 1975, the
Navy liberalized the escalation clause to provide for more
equitable distribution of risk. The new clause allows for
payment on the basis of actual expenditure phasing, and
allowable costs incurred not to exceed ceiling price. Im-
portantly, unlike previous clauses, payment is to continue
to actual delivery date.
It must be pointed out that the old clause re-
quired the determination of cause of the delay. This de-
manded settlement from the inception of the contract. Second-
ly, the risk in forecasting feasible dates far in advance




To characterize most previous Navy shipbuilding
contracts , it can be said that they were fixed price incen-
tive fee (FPIF) contracts and covered systems which were
under concurrent development and construction. The Navy has
come under considerable attack from shipbuilders for employ-
ing this procedure. The shipbuilders contend that, under
FPIF contract, they assume too much of the risk, and con-
tracts must be restructured so as to equitably distribute
the risk.
The contractors have proposed cost type contracts
for the lead ship of a class, and a longer period of time
between the lead and follow ship construction. By incorpo-
rating these innovations, claims should be reduced. In
testimony before the Seapower Subcommittee for the Committee
on Armed Services for the House of Representatives in 1974,
J. P. Diesel, J. T. Gilbride, E. Hartzman, and F. W. O'Green
recommended that Congress require the Navy to contract for
new ships on a cost type basis until inflation is brought
under control and existing procurement problems are solved.
At these same hearings , the then Secretary of the Navy
Middendorf stated that many of the present claims problems
appear to stem largely from improper application of fixed
price contracts. Many Navy personnel involved in the acquisi-
tion process have also proposed the use of cost type contracts
on lead ships. In a memorandum to Admiral Michalais on 7 May
1976, Admiral Evans proposed several changes to the ship
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acquisition process. Among the proposals were the use of
cost type contracts for lead ships, the use of more flexible
delivery dates , longer intervals between construction of
lead and follow ships, higher target to ceiling cost spreads,
and, finally, when using a fixed price contract, the inclu-
sion of'a clause which recognizes a single contingency, such
as an upcoming union agreement.
The consensus for change to cost type contracts
was not unanimous. One of the major dissenters was Admiral
Rickover. He felt that the Navy should remain with fixed
price incentive fee contracts because it gives financial in-
centive to the contractors. He further recommended that if
the problems experienced with the contractors cannot be re-
solved, the Government should acquire all shipyards and con-
tract with private companies for operation. Admiral Rickover
has cited, as precedence for this action, the aerospace indus-
try. Most of the facilities used to produce aircraft for the
military are owned by the Government and industries contract
for their use.
Many of the recommendations made by Admiral Evans
have been incorporated into the contract for the FFG-7 claso
ship procurement. At this time, it is difficult to determine
the success of the contract, but it is being promoted as a
model for the future. However, it is anticipated that claims
problems will be reduced because of the cost type contract
for the lead ship and because a longer period of time has




The enclosed appendices have been included to provide
amplifying information for readers who are unfamiliar with
the shipbuilding industry and procurement procedures.
Appendix D has been included because many of the issues
' raised in the CGN-Ul case are also present in claims cases
and information is provided to extend any discussion of the
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Exhibit 3. Contract Modification P00018
The parties agree to negotiate in good faith to reach an
agreement as rapidly as possible on the provisions of this
contract which requires modification in order to express the
greement of the parties as to new option provisions for DLGN-
41 and DLGN-42. Therefore, such contract modification will:
i) establish a target cost, a target price, a ceiling
price, and a share ratio within the profit-cost envelope set
for the below for each option so exercised separate from
that for the other ships under this contract, and revise
Article 7, entitled "Limitation of Contractor's Liability for
Correction of Defects," to provide a limitation on the con-
tractor's liability for correction of defects for each ves-
sel to two percent (2%) of the initial target price for that
vessel;
ii) pursuant to Article 5 hereof, titled, "Incentive
Price Revisions (Firm Target)," provide for a total final
negotiated cost separate from DLGN-38, 39 and 40 combined;
iii) establish escalation tables separate and different
from those for DLGN-38, 39 and 40 combined;
iv) as necessary, modify the payment provision to pro-
vide payment for DLGN-41 and 42 separate from DLGN-38, 39
and 40;





vi) establish a fixed fee and other terms and condi-
tions on account of the work which may be required by the
Option Conditions described below which will be effective
until the corresponding option is exercised, or the work,
which may have been continued pursuant to the direction of
the contracting officer stops
;
vii) contain a provision for computing equitable adjust-
ment because of changes in the Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers' Act, the Federal Insurance Compensation Act, State
Workmen's Compensation Act, Unemployment, Disability Compen-
sation and Public Liability Acts occurring since June of
1970; and
viii) revise schedule "A" to provide for DLGN-41 and 42






Exhibit 4. Navy Maximum Position
Target Profit = Target Price - Target Cost
Target Cost Target Price Ceiling Price
$76,050,000 $85,741,000 $100,951,000









X < 85% Target Cost
100% > X > 85% Target
Cost
X = Target Cost
100% < X < 115%
Target Cost
X > 115% Target Cost
Profit (+) or Loss (-)
will be equal to:
Target profit +
5% (Target cost -
85% Target cost) +
10% (85% Target
cost - Negotiable Cost)




Target profit - 5%
Negotiable cost -
Target cost)
Target profit - 5%
(115%-100% Target cost)
-10% (Negotiable cost
- 115% Target cost)

Exhibit 5. Item That Must Be Negotiated Under
the DLGN Ul and DLGN 42 Contract Options
1. Maximum Price and Ceiling - The maximum price is negoti-
able downward only.
2. Contract Closeout Accounting Procedures - This is a
necessary administrative item as a result of the separate
pricing structure of DLGN-41 and 42 and is not a matter of
disagreement
.
3. Escalation Tables Separate and Different from DLGN 38-40
- Separate pre-negotiated and fixed tables are required to
effect the separate pricing structure of DLGN-41 and 42 and
to replace escalation tables established in the original con-
tract for different contract delivery dates. Newport News
is entitled to negotiate an equitable escalation distribu-
tion based on the material and labor expenditure schedules.
To date Newport Nev7S has not been willing to discuss the
fixed escalation tables, required by the contract, but has
instead proposed that escalation be paid based on whatever
expenditure schedule Newport News incurs in contract perform-
ance, regardless of ceiling price or contract delivery date.
Under the contract any agreement must have a pre-negotiated
expenditure schedule. Any agreed to schedule would have to
be consistent with the contract delivery dates. The negoti-
able range represents about three million dollars per ship
in eventual escalation payments.
4. Payment Provisions - Newport News is entitled to negoti-
a.te a new payment provision for the DLGN-41 and DLGN 42.
Newport News has proposed that payments based on progress not
to exceed 105% of incurred cost (up to ceiling) be made. This
proposal is consistent with the CVAN-68, 69 and CVN-70 con-
tract and is considered equitable. The proposal for DLGN-41
and DLGN-42 differs from that agreed to in the DLGN-38 con-
tract only in that maximum payments of 105% in lieu of 100%
of cost over the first half of the contract are proposed.
5. Revise the Project Milestone - Negotiation of this item




Interim Fee for Long Lead Material Procurement Effort -
This item provides for interim payment of fee for long lead
effort until exercise of the option incorporates the interim
fee into the total contract price and fee structure. Because
the DLGN-41 option has been exercised, this item does not
have to be negotiated for DLGN-41. In their unacceptable
repricing proposal Newport News has proposed a 7^ percent
interim profit on the long lead effort for DLGN-42. Since
the long lead effort is primarily material procurement and
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is, in total, on a cost-reimbursable basis, 5 percent is the
maximum interim profit that should be accepted. 5 percent
is consistent with the CVN-70 long lead effort agreement.
7. Changes to Workmen's Benefits - This item covers increase
in cost due to changes m federal and state laws as social
security and workmen's compensation occurring since June,
1970. Reimbursement of Newport News for these added costs
will result in estimated payments of about 7.5 million dol-
lars per ship. It is a Navy obligation under the Contract
to make such payments outside the pricing envelope. The
amount of the payments will be fixed by the actual changes in
the federal and state laws. The only negotiable item is the
structure of the clause that does this.
8
.
Schedule for Government Furnished Equipment Delivery -




APPENDIX A. NOTE ON SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
A. WORLD MARKET
The world's principal shipbuilding industries are found
in Japan, Europe, and the United States. Japan is the single
largest shipbuilding nation in the world, producing approxi-
mately 50% of all the ships measured in dead weight tonnage.
The European countries, primarily Sweden, Great Britain and
West Germany, account for nearly 50% of the dead weight ton-
nage, also. All of this indicates that the United States is
not an important factor in the world's shipbuilding market.
Although it would be difficult to compare prices and
costs between the various shipbuilding nations , some compari-
sons can be made to show why the world market is structured
the way it is. The most significant relationship is the differ-
ence between the controllable-uncontrollable cost breakdown
between the United States and Japan. In the United States
the uncontrollable costs constitute approximately 50% of the
total costs while in Japan these costs are only 30% of the
total costs. United States shipbuilders have little control
over their costs, and because of their low volume, they can-
not exert any real leverage on their suppliers. Therefore,
for a U.S. shipbuilder to reduce costs by 2%, he must reduce
shipyard costs by U to 5%.
Another important factor is the relationship between a
country's government and its shipbuilders. For instance,
in Japan, the national policy is intimately linked to its
shipbuilders and the government utilizes control and inter-
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vention to maintain a strong shipbuilding industry. Shipbuil-
ders have utilized Government sponsored programs in which ship-
yards are guaranteed contracts for up to six years, and this
strengthens the industry. With this type of approach, the
shipbuilders can do extensive advance planning and can rely on
heavy capital investment to improve their efficiency. Similar
practices are used in European countries. This huge capital
investment into more advanced techniques has not been widely
seen in the United States because of the manner in which ship-
building orders are placed without the guarantee of a long
term backlog of orders. The United States shipbuilding indus-
try represents only 0.3% of this country's GNP, ranking UOth




To illustrate the differences in productivity of the dif-
ferent countries, a flow rate index has been developed. The
flow rate index is the ratio of tons delivered during the year,
divided by the tons under construction at the start of the
year, where a value of 100 means equal volumes. Japan has con-
sistently had flow rate indexes above 150 and Europe has had
values near 100, while the flow rate index for the United
States has been near 50.
B. MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 19 70
In an effort to build up the U.S. Merchant Marine so that
it could be a competitive force. Congress passed the Merchant
Marine Act of 1970. This act allowed for the use of federal
government funds to allow for construction-differential sub-
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sidles, operating differential subsidies, an ongoing research
and development program, and to provision for training. One
of the primary purposes of this act was to increase commercial
shipbuilding orders to domestic shipyards on a long term basis,
This encourages capital investment, which improves the effi-
ciency of the shipbuilders.
Construction subsidies are based on the difference between
United States and foreign shipbuilding costs. These subsidies
are paid to U.S. shipbuilders so that ships can be constructed
at the same cost as that charged by a foreign shipbuilder.
For example, if the cost to produce a ship is $100 million in
a domestic shipyard and the cost in a foreign shipyard is $70
million, the U.S. government would pay the difference of $30
million to the shipbuilder. To pay the remaining $70 million,
the buyer must contribute 25% of this and the U.S. government
will guarantee a loan for the remaining 75%.
Operating subsidies are also based upon the difference be-
tween United States and foreign vessel operating costs and
are paid to promote the maintenance of a U.S. -flag merchant
fleet capable of providing essential shipping services.
After the passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970,
American shipbuilders have made $371 million in capital invest-
ments in the first four years and have investments of another
$343 million planned. The leaders in capital investment have
been Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Todd Ship-
yards, and Litton 's Ingalls Shipyard.
American shipbuilders, who engage in U.S. Navy shipbuild-
ing, do so in a way that has been unique within Defense Depart-
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ment acquisition contracting. Until recently they were the
only contractors who were able to recover costs due to rising
prices and labor costs under the escalation clause included
in all contracts.
C. U. S. SHIPBUILDERS
There are 188 private shipyards and shipwork contractors
with Navy master ship repair contracts ; 117 of these are on
the Navy's bidders 'list for new construction and conversion
programs. The dollar value of the backlog in these shipyards
as of January 1977 was $9.9 billion. This backlog is composed
of 162 ships of which 91 are Navy and 71 are commercial. Of
the 117 shipyards on the Navy's bidders' list, only 11 have
current and previous major Navy new ship construction experi-
ence. There are currently 96 ships under contract, and of
these, 6 5 are in three shipyards: Newport News, Electric Boat
3(General Dynamics ), and Litton.
Between 1968 and 1977, average construction of new ships
was 13 per year and, under present plans, the Navy is striv-
ing for 31 ships per year. Historically, U.S. shipbuilders
have had a difficult time in acquiring, training, and keeping
qualified personnel, with turnover rates averaging over 40%
per year. The major contributions to this problem appear to
be a lack of assurance of continuing work, unpleasant working
conditions, and wage rate differentials within the construc-
tion industry.
The following outline briefly describes the capabilities
of the major United States shipbuilders and indicates which
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of these currently, or have in the past been, engaged in
shipbuilding for the U.S. Navy:
1. Avondale Shipyard, Inc.
a. Facilities:
Two side launching ways, one of which is capable
of building ships up to 600 feet long and 80
feet beam, weighing up to 5000 long tons. It is
actually a five position assembly line. 75% of
the labor is expended before the ship is launched.
The other way is similar, but can build ships
1200 feet long and 130 foot beam, weighing
15,600 tons. Divided between three piers, there
are 3565 feet of pier space for final outfitting
and overhauls. Support equipment includes cranes,
a derrick barge, and a floating dock.
b. Avondale Shipbuilding is one of the most modern
facilities in the United States- having made the
shipbuilding process very similar to an assembly
line process. Previous Navy shipbuilding con-
sisted of ships of the DE 1052 class. Commer-
cial ventures include LASH ships and oil rigs.
c. Avondale is unique in another respect, in that
it is a non-union yard. The local labor pool can
provide 20% of the necessary skills, and the
remainder must be trained on the job, with ship-
fitters the hardest to hire.
d. Avondale Shipyards is owned by Bayou Shipyards,




Bath Iron Works Corporation
a. Facilities
There are 3 building ways. In each of these
building ways, they have the capability of
building ships up to 650 feet long with a beam
of 80 feet, and in two of the ways, two ships
can be built, side by side. There are two
wharves totaling 930 feet and a 626 foot pier
available for outfitting. There is also a
partial drydock used for bow sonar dome instal-
lations. The more conventional shipbuilding
methods are used by Bath.
b. Bath is currently the lead shipyard in the FFG-
7 class construction.
c. The corporation experiences difficulty in obtain-
ing skilled workers from the local labor pool,
but utilize a training program. There is a
continued loss of trained personnel to other
industries, particularly to the construction
industry. This problem is especially acute dur-
ing the spring.
3. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Shipbuilding Division,
Sparrows Point Yard
a. Facilities
There are 7 building ways, with the largest of
these being 769 feet by 110 feet. There is
also a building basin with a capacity for vessels
up to 300,000 dead weight tons. There are 4
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piers with a total length of 3970 feet, and two
of these are available for outfitting.
b. Bethlehem Steel has removed itself from Navy
shipbuilding and is currently working on large
commercial tankers
.
c. They have difficulty in getting and maintaining
an adequate force and limit their commitments
to that which can be accomplished with the avail-
able work force. Management feels that there is
a 20 year gap at the craft level and considers
this a major problem.
M- . General Dynamics Corporation, Quincy Shipbuilding
Division
a. Facilities
At the Quincy facility, there are three building
basins capable of building vessels up to 225,000
dead weight tons. The corporation has recently
expanded their operation by acquiring the faci-
lity at Quonset Point.
b. General Dynamics is currently building (or has
under contract) 18 attack submarines and 5 Tri-
dent missile submarines. In 1972, the company
committed itself solely to the building of Navy
submarines and is regarded as a leader in this
area.
c. General Dynamics does not see the labor market
as a constraint to expansion, but admits to dif-
ficulties in obtaining sufficient shipbuilders
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with experience. There is a very active train-
ing program and government ^ supported programs
. . 7for veterans and minorities.
5. Litton Industries
a. Facilities
Litton has two facilities: the East Bank, which
is a conventional shipyard, and the West Bank,
which uses a modular construction method. On
the East Bank, there are 7 usable building ways
with the largest capable of 18,000 long tons.
There are 3700 feet of mooring space for outfit-
ting. The West Bank is one of the most modern
facilities in the United States. It consists of
an assembly area with 5 bays and an integration
zone. The launch pontoon is capable of holding
a ship with an equivalent weight of 160,000 DWT.
The ships constructed by the modular process are
80-90% outfitted prior to launch.
b. Litton, in the past, has constructed nuclear sub-
marines for the Navy and is now under contract
for 5 LHA's and 3 destroyers. In addition,
Litton is also executing contracts on several
commercial ships.
c. Litton feels that the labor market exists to
meet demand, but also realizes that it is in
competition with other construction industries
for skilled craftsmen. Both facilities exercise
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extensive training programs, incorporating class-
8
room type training with on-the-job training,
6. National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO)
a. Facilities
The facilities include 4 building ways with a
maximum capacity of 21,000 long tons. There is
a total of 3800 feet of pier space for outfitting
and repair.
b. NASSCO primarily deals with commercial tanker
construction, but has constructed Navy ships.
Their largest Navy contract was for 17 LST's in
the early 1970 's. They have also built several
auxiliary ships and are presently under contract
to build two destroyer tenders.
c. NASSCO has a good local labor pool to draw from,
but it is not adequate to fill the necessary
crafts when the yard approaches full employment.
When they go outside the local area, there is
stiff competition, particularly for pipefitters
and shipfitters. Also, they lose qualified
personnel to other construction industries due
9
to lower pay m NASSCO yards.
7. Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company
a. Facilities
The facilities include 5 building ways, with the
largest capable of handling a ship up to 50,000
long tons. There are also two building basins
able to handle a ship up to 80,0 00 long tons.
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It has recently expanded its facilities to in-
clude the capability of building ultra-large
cargo carriers up to 2 50,000 DWTo It has also
more than 7000 feet of pier space for outfitting
and repair.
b. Newport News is very active in both commercial
and Navy shipbuilding and repair. Newport News
is the only shipyard in the United States which
builds nuclear surface ships; it has built
nuclear aircraft carriers and cruisers. It is
also currently the leading shipyard in the con-
struction of the attack submarine (SSN-688).
c. Newport News has one of the lowest turnover rates
in the U.S. shipbuilding industry; it feels that
sufficient labor exists to fulfill their needs;
there is no constraint to expansion. However,
there is considerable effort placed by other in-
dustries to hire away people who have been trained
in nuclear engineering. One of these groups is
the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Newport News has




Todd has divisions in Brooklyn, New York; New
Orleans, Louisiana; Galveston, Texas; Houston,
Texas; San Pedro, California; Alameda, California;
and Seattle, Washington. The Seattle and San
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Pedro Divisions are the only ones in ship con-
^struction, but the Galveston Division is expand-
ing to include construction of very large cargo
carriers
.
The facilities at San Pedro Division consist
of two building ways capable of handling ships
up to 7000 long tons, two floating dry docks,
and approximately 3000 feet of pier space.
The facilities at the Seattle Division con-
sist of two building ways capable of handling
ships up to 450 long tons, three dry docks, and
pier and wharf space which can berth 11 ships.
b. Currently, both the Seattle and San Pedro Divi-
sions are actively engaged in commercial ship-
building. However, Todd is under contract to
the Navy to build seven ships of the FFG-7 class
as the follow shipbuilder to Bath Iron Works.
c. The San Pedro Division has difficulty in obtain-
ing qualified personnel in the outfitting trades,
but sees no constraint on expansion because of
the labor. They do not use an apprenticeship
program but rather on-the-job training.
The Seattle Division has difficulty in obtaining
enough qualified welders and boilermakers , but
sees no real constraint on expansion due to labor,
It has training programs to meet specific needs;




APPENDIX B. NOTE ON NEWPORT NEWS
A. HISTORY
The Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company was
founded by the industrialist and railroad magnet, Collis P.
Huntington, in 1886 in order to stimulate activities at the
port terminus of the Chesapeake and Ohio railroad, which he
controlled. The Shipyard remained family owned until it
went on the New York Stock Exchange in 1940. In 1968 the
Shipyard was purchased and now is wholly owned by Tenneco,
a major company with extensive interests in chemicals,
natural gas pipelines, oil, automotive parts, farm and con-
struction equipment, packaging, and land use. When it was
purchased, the yard had become one of the largest and best
equipped in the world, as well as the largest in the United
States. In 1973, Tenneco, based in Houston, Texas, rated
2fifteenth m assets m the 1973 Fortune's "five hundred."
The Newport News Shipyard is located on 470 acres along
a two mile stretch of the James River in the lower peninsula
of Virginia. The port is referred to as Hampton Roads. The
northern bank community has a population of approximately
292,000. It is located directly across the river from the
large Naval Shipyard at Portsmouth, Virginia and from the
largest U.S. Naval concentration of ships > ^f Norfolk, Virgina,
The community from which the Company received its name had
originally received the name, Newport News, after good news
was brought to the port by a Merchant Captain Newport in
the pre-colonial period. Today the Yard consists of six
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graving docks, six sliding type building ways, and ten piers.
It is manned by 26,000 employees, some of whom are fourth
generation employees. The Shipyard does not build modular
hulls, as are built by Litton and General Dynamics. Rather,
each ship is custom built.
Newport News has built over 600 ships of all types. In
World War I, Newport News built over twenty percent of the
U.S. Fleet. In 1934, the Shipyard delivered the first ship
built, from the keel up, as an Aircraft Carrier, the USS
Ranger. Since that time, Newport News has designed and con-
structed all but one of our aircraft carriers. In 1950,
Newport News delivered the first intercontinental ballistic
missile submarine, USS Robert E. Lee, and one year later,
built the world's first Nuclear Aircraft Carrier, USS Enter-
prise, plus the Nuclear Attack Submarine, USS Shark.
B. COMPOSITION
The Shipyard is divided into four profit centers: com-
mercial ship repair, commercial ship construction, industrial
work, and Naval Construction and Repair. The Yard has always
done commercial repair work, ranging in scope from less than
one week trip work to extensive overhauls lasting several
months. Repair work is highly profitable and is limited only
by space and labor. The Yard turns away $50 million worth of
5
work, equal to that which it performs each year.
Newport News had always built commercial ships, but in
1971, it had been two years since the Shipyard finished the
last of five cargo vessels for the American Mail Lines.
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Now, the Shipyard has completed a 150 acre, land-fill expan-
sion of its commercial facility on the James River. Its
pride is a new 1600 feet long by 250 feet wide graving dock,
with a mammoth 9 00 ton gantry crane which is 5 40 feet be-
tween rail centers.
Newport News is now constructing six ships (worth $200
million) in its commercial yard. Three of these are LNG
ships, (two of which have now been launched) for the company's
Algeria to East Coast run. The three remaining are ULCCs,
(ultra large cargo carriers) of 3 90,0 00 DV\/T. The ULCCs, two
of which are for Shell Oil Company, will be the largest ships
ever built in North America. The building of these ships at
Newport News and the required building of the large new faci-
lity may have been the result of the Navy's decision to re-
frain from assigning the steel priority to Todd Shipyards
7
when Todd was attempting to build these ships. Had Todd
been able to obtain the steel, the new facility might have
been located on the southern Gulf Coast.
In the past, the Newport News Industrial Corporation has
marketed the industrial capability of the yard machine shops
and foundry, which amounts to 7% of sales; but, more recent-
ly, it is capitalizing on the yard's twenty five years of
nuclear experience by involvement in the construction of
three nuclear power stations. The largest, with the Cleve-
land Ohio Electric Company, amounts to over $100 million
worth of work. The Newport News subsidiary, the Nuclear Ser-
vice Corporation, has joined with General Electric and
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Westinghouse in nuclear power station repair vjork, and looks
9to future expansion m this area.
The source of this expertise (and the lion's share of the
Yard's work) is the Navy ship construction, overhauls and
repairs. Currently, Newport News is the only shipyard cap-
able of building and servicing all Navy ships. This is, of
course, because Newport is the only shipyard building nuclear
surface vessels, particularly, nuclear aircraft carriers.
Current Projects
Newport News is currently building the aircraft carrier
CVN70 Carl Vinson (named for a Congressional friend of Naval
construction), two Virginia class Cruiser CGNs , 40 and 41,
and four SSN688 class nuclear attack submarines. The yard
has an additional eleven SSN688 class ships on a contract
which extends into FY 1984. By the end of 1977, Newport News
had, in one year, delivered to the Navy: the submarine Baton
Rouge in June, the cruiser Texas in July, the carrier Eisen-
hower in September, and the submarine Memphis in December.
This is a peacetime record for nuclear tonnage.
In addition to the nuclear construction, Newport News
overhauled, repaired and refueled three nuclear submarines
in 1977. At present, there are only six commercial and Navy
yards capable of refueling nuclear ships. Refueling, which
may take up to two years to complete, is an extensive process
only surpassed in complexity and magnitude of effort by new
ship construction. Refuelings are now done on an allocation
basis. Recent labor shortages and Trident contracts at
General Dynamics indicate that an increased capacity is
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required. Newport News, on its own and at considerable
capital investment and risk, is expanding its refueling
capacity. In January 197 8, the yard started construction
of a second large graving dock to be used solely for
nuclear submarine overhaul and refueling.
106

APPENDIX C. NOTE ON NAVY SHIP PROCUREMENT
A. COMPOSITION OF FLEET
The Navy has seen the number of ships in the fleet decline
markedly since 1968, when there were 976 ships, to 476 ships
in 1976. In 1976, the active Navy fleet consisted of 13 air-
craft carriers, 41 SSBN's, 64 SSN's, 159 surface combatants,
and 19 9 amphibious and support ships.
The decline in number of ships is often explained as be-
ing the result of an increase in the sophistication, capabil-
ity, and cost per unit. The reduced numbers are also ex-
plained in the economic reality of the Vietnam War and a
"guns and butter" economic policy which left little for ship
construction. The actual number of ships required to meet
strategic international objectives, as well as domestic ob-
jectives, is itself subject to national debate. Current Con-
gressional and Executive branches appear to have agreed on a
total figure near 460 ships, consisting of 12 to 14 aircraft
carriers and a mix of nuclear submarines, surface combatants,
amphibious assault ships, and support ships.
Along with the restricted funding and low authorized num-
bers, the Navy and the construction contractors have not pro-
duced to the authorized levels, although they have surpassed
the cost goals. It is not difficult to observe that, given
the present production of 13 ships a year and an average life
for these ships of 25 years, the resultant number of ships in
the Navy will be some 3 25 and not the proposed number of 46 0.
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The concept of military needs can and does change over
the long program schedules and this will determine and pos-
sibly alter the number of ships of a given class which are
procured. Another problem is the slippage in delivery
schedules which can be two years or more. Prolonged sched-
ules have two prominent effects: first, the cost of ships
increases markedly; and, second, the extended schedule re-
sults in the inability to meet number goals.
The cost will increase when there is schedule slippage,
primarily because of the absorption of the tremendous fixed
costs and overhead in the shipyards, and these costs are
amplified by escalation in the shipbuilding industry. In
these shipyards, labor and material costs have increased at
rates almost double those of any non-construction industry.
In order to attempt to prevent delivery of obsolete weapons
systems, changes are required to update a slowly developing
system. This also contributes to cost growth.
The delivery schedule is a major factor on cost and num-
bers of ships constructed. Doubling the schedule will cut
in half the number of ships delivered each year. In the
early 1960 's, the United States was producing 19 nuclear ves-
sels a year from five commercial shipyards and two Navy ship-
yards. Today, there are only two shipyards, both commercial,
producing nuclear ships : Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry-
dock Company and the Electric Boat Division of General Dy-
namics. A recent estimate of their total combined output is
eight vessels per year.
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B. SHIP PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES
1. Evolution of Navy Organization
The procurement of ships by the Navy is as old as
the country. The Navy's present organization, as shown in
Exhibit 2 , came about from the evolution of the Departments
of the Army and Navy to the Department of Defense, and in-
cludes within itself the birth in 1966 of the Naval Ships
System Command from the old Bureau of Ships and again, in
1974, when the Naval Ordnance System Command was combined
with the Naval Ships System Command to form the Naval Sea
Systems Command. At the present time, there is a distinct
separation between those who operate the ships (represented
by the Operational Navy) and the Naval Material Command
(who are the procurers),
2. Acquisition Policies
Prior to 1964, the Navy practiced a policy of allo-
cating ships to various shipyards on the basis of shipyard's
ability to perform the work and on the basis of their back-
log. Most of the design of these ships was done within
what was then the Bureau of Ships. There was, to a degree,
competition for Navy shipbuilding contracts.
During the period of 1968 to 1971, the Navy, under
instruction from Mr. McNamara (who was Secretary of Defense)
practiced total package procurement. Under this policy, the
Navy would present requirements to the contractors and have
the shipbuilders develop the ship concepts, designs, and
then the actual construction, with only advisement from the
Naval Ship Engineering Center. This was a highly competitive
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process. This process provided another layer in addition
to those of the Material Command and only hampered (by con-
tracts) any real dialog with the operational force.
After 1971, the procurement process became totally
competitive, with the conceptual design and contract design
being done within the Naval Ship Engineering Center. Dr.
Leopold, the present director of Naval Ship Design within
the Naval Ship Engineering Center, has criticized the incon-
sistency of the Navy organization and policy in regards to
the wavering policy of conceptual design and total package
procurement. He suggested inhouse design of ships to pro-
vide clarity in requirements.
In 1975, when Congress passed the appropriations
bill, they included a section (Title VIII) which required
that all new major combatant ships for the strike force be
nuclear powered. Exhibit C-1 gives the major points of
Title VIII.
Another policy, which was adopted in 1976, was the
Five-Year Defense Program. This program has a dual purpose
The first purpose is to obtain funds for shipbuilding for
an extended period of time and the second is to provide to




TITLE VIII OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ACT, 19 7 5
Section 801. Makes it the policy of the United States to
modernize the Navy by building major combatant
vessels for the strike forces with nuclear
power.
Section 802. Defines major combatant vessels for the strike
forces as including combatant submarines; com-
batant vessels for aircraft carrier task groups
which include aircraft carriers and the cruisers
and destroyers which accompany them; and com-
batant vessels of these types designed for in-
dependent missions where essentially unlimited
high speed endurance will be of significant
military value.
Section 803. Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to
Congress a written report each year which pre-
sents the Department of Defense Five-Year De-
fense Program for construction of nuclear
powered warships.
Section 804. Defines the conditions under which it is legal
for the Department to request authorization
of appropriations from Congress for major com-
bat vessels for the strike forces which are
not nuclear powered. The President must in-
clude in his request and a nuclear ship alter-
native to his proposal and Congress may decide




APPENDIX D. NOTE ON CLAIMS PROCEDURES,
HISTORY AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this chapter will be to outline the pro-
cedure for claims processing in the Navy. In addition, an
abbreviated history of claims will be presented. The final
section will give background into some of the causes of
claims and effects of claims.
B. REVIEW OF CLAIMS PROCESS
The present system for processing claims is made up of
three levels: the contracting officer level, the administra-
tive level (or agency head level), and the judicial level.
Throughout the dispute process, work must continue on the
contract, and at any time during the process, both parties
can decide to settle the issue by negotiation and agreement.
The contracting officer derives his power in this process
from the disputes clause written into government contracts.
This is normally the standard ASPR disputes clause for sup-
ply and construction contracts which provides that any dis-
pute concerning a question of fact (and which is not disposed
of by agreement) shall be disposed of by a unilateral decision
by the contracting officer. The contractor may then appeal
his decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA).
The ASBCA is a single board of attorneys within the De-
partment of Defense that represents the heads of the Military
Departments in deciding appeals from a contracting officer's
112

decision. The dispute must arise under the contract and the
finality of the decision is limited to questions of fact.
Only the courts may ultimately decide questions of law.
Heading the board is a chairman and two vice-chairmen, each
of whom is appointed for a two-year term by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ISL) and by the departmental Assistant
Secretaries responsible for procurement. One important as-
pect of the ASBCA is that a decision rendered by the board
which is deemed adverse by the Government cannot be appealed,
while the contractor can appeal any decision of the board.
If the dispute involves a breach of contract for which
there is no administrative relief, the Court of Claims or a
U.S. District Court (for claims of $10,000 or less) has
jurisdiction over the appeal, and the contractor must go di-
rectly to the courts. While the contractor has only 3 days
to file a dispute, the statute of limitations for a breach
of contract claim allows six years to institute a suit in
court. The contractor can obtain a court decision by appeal-
ing the ASBCA decision.
While the disputes clause provides for settlement of dis-
agreements within the contract as written. Public Law 85-804
provides for relief outside the contract. Under this law
relief can be given when it facilitates national defense.
Among other things, the following types of extraordinary con-
tract amendments outride the terms of existing contracts, if
this action will aid the national defense: (1) amendments
without consideration, (2) amendments correcting mutual mis-

takes and ambiguities, and (3) amendments and contracts for-
malizing informal commitments.
An amendment without consideration is authorized when a
contractor suffers a loss on a defense contract because of
Government action. This could be the case, even where the
Government is not liable as a matter of law, but fairness
dictates that some adjustments must be made to a contract.
The last two amendments do, as was stated, clarify mutual
mistakes and formalize informal commitments.
Under normal conditions the contractor requests relief
under Public Law 85-804 and does so only after all adminis-
trative methods have been pursued.
C. ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROCESS
There is a great deal of administrative effort required
to adjudicate a claim. Prior to the contracting officer's
decision, a team composed of legal and technical advisors
is created to study the claim and make recommendations.
After the contracting officer makes his decision as to settle-
ment, the procuring agency and/or personnel in Headquarters,
Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) conduct a detailed review of
that decision.
The composition of the claims team has changed because
of increasing claims, increasing visibility of claims, and
by changes in the head of the NAVMAT organization. In October
1969, the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) established the Con-
tract Claims Control and Surveillance Group (CCCSG) under the
chairmanship of the Director of Navy Contract Clearance,
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Mr. Gordon Rule. The object of a CCCSG was to determine if
the proposed settlement figure had complete, substantive
merit and was adequately supported by documented evidence.
When Admiral Isaac Kidd became CNM in the fall of 1971, he
abolished the CCCSG, and in its place, established a NMC
Claims Board and a General Board for Claims Review. The in-
tention was to have claims settled at the lowest possible
level in the contracting framework and to raise the value of
claims that must be reviewed by the General Board to $10
million. In 1976, because of increasing volume of claims,
increasing dollar amounts, and importance placed on equitable
settlement, Admiral Manganaro was appointed to head a "Navy
Claims Settlement Board," thus returning claims settlement
to a very high level and eliminating lower teams
.
The contractor, as noted earlier, can appeal the decision
of the Navy claims board by submitting to ASBCA a Notice of
Appeal identifying the contract, the contracting officer,
and the decision from which relief is requested. This docu-
ment is submitted to the contracting officer, who must send
it on to the ASBCA within ten days. Within thirty days of
ASBCA notice that the case has been docketed, the contractor
must submit the complaint which outlines the contractor's
position and gives the type and amount of relief requested.
The government, after receipt of notice, must submit the
following in accordance with ASPR Appendix A, part 2 (Rule 4);
1. The findings of fact and the decision from which the
appeal is taken, and the letter or letters or other documents
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of the claim in response to which the decision was issued,
2. The contract, and pertinent plans, specifications,
amendments, and change orders.
3. Correspondence between the parties and other data
pertinent to the appeal,
M- . Transcripts of any testimony taken during the course
of the proceedings.
5, Such additional information as may be considered per-
tinent.
The Government must file an answer to the complaint which
gives a defense of each item in the complaint within thirty
days of when the complaint was filed. Amendments to the con-
tractor's complaint and the Government's defense may be filed
at any time, subject to the ASBCA's discretion. A major com-
plaint with this portion of the process is that it is too
time consuming, costly, and complicated. In addition, if
there is any delay by the Government in preparing its position,
this may become an issue in the dispute.
To prevent any further litigation of the same dispute
after the ASBCA decision, the contracting officer must submit
a supplemental agreement stipulating final adjudication of
issue.
D, CLAIMS HISTORY
Claims against the Government for the construction of
warships are not new. Table D-1 gives a brief history of
the claims, showing the number of claims, dollar value of
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In 19 67, the value of the claims submitted to the Government
was $39 million, jumped to $900 million in 1971, fell off
slightly to $500 in 1973, and at the end of 1976, the value
of the claims outstanding against the Government was $2.46
billion on contracts valued at $4.6 billion.
The following example gives a breakdown of several claims
that have been settled with Newport News Shipbuilding and
Drydock Company
:
1. Settlement of the LKA 113-116 claim.
a. The claim was based on deficient GFI and Govern-
ment actions constituting constructive changes,
resulting from late GFE and excessive inspections
b. The amount of the claim was in excess of $29
2
million and was settled for $15.5 million.
2. Settlement of DLGN 36-37 claim.
a. The claim was based oh delay and disruption with
the following breakdown:
(1) $9,105,2 26 for hardware on 24 change orders
which contractor has attributed delay to.
(2) $24,634,581 for delay attributed to the 24
change orders.
(3) $3,282,700 for disruption attributed to the
2 4 change orders.
(4) $285,0 00 for constructive changes for correc-
tion of accessibility items.
b. Claim was originally submitted for $35 million




3, At the end of 1976, Newport News Shipbuilding and
Drydock Company had six claims pending against the
Government totaling $749.6 million and involving
13 ships. The following is a breakdown of each
claim:
a. CYAN 68, 69 $221.3 million
b. SSN 686, 687 $ 90.4 million
c. SSN 688 $ 78.5 million
d. SSN 688 class $191.6 million
e. CGN 38, 39, 40 $159.8 million
f. SSBN 624 $ 7.8 million
E. ISSUES COMPRISING CLAIMS
There are many issues which can be the basis for a claim.
In the remainder of this section, some of these issues will
be defined so as to provide a better understanding.
1. Delay and Disruption:
a. Delay claims represent costs incurred as a result
of slippage in delivery of the ship. They in-
clude the increased cost of doing originally
planned work in a later time period and additional
"housekeeping" costs that occur when a ship is
delayed. The contractor must show that delay is
the responsibility of the Government.
b. Disruption represents costs incurred when normal
planned work must be rescheduled or redone due
to unplanned or changed conditions. Disruption
is probably the hardest area to definitize and
on which to place a dollar value.
1 1 q

c. Contractors have recently cited another area which
is very similar to disruption and is called the
"ripple effect". This "ripple effect" is the
adverse effect on other shipyard work as a result
of delay or disruption on Navy shipbuilding.
Here again, the determination of an accurate
dollar value is most difficult and, until recently,
the Navy has not recognized the validity of such
a claim.
d. In 1972, the delay and disruption portion of the
shipbuilder's claim constituted 17 or 48% of a
claim, but today they constitute 88 to 90% of a
claim,
2, Escalation
Due to the fact that shipbuilding contracts exist over
an extended period of time, (from 5 to 10 years), a
clause has been included in the contracts to provide
relief from cost increases for material and labor.
Prior to 1975, the period covered by the escalation
clause was the delivery date specified by the contract.
The amount of relief achieved was tied to the Bureau
of Labor statistics. Beginning in 1975, a new escala-
tion clause was developed and it stipulated that:
a. Escalation is paid on the basis of actual expendi-
ture phasing.
b. Escalation is paid on the basis of allowable costs




c. Escalation continues to actual delivery date.
This new clause was not made retroactive. Even though
it would be desirable to have a uniform escalation
clause for all contracts, the policy of custom tailor-
ing the escalation clause to each contract is used.
This is best demonstrated by Table D-2, where the
escalation for three different contracts is shown.
3. Cash Flow
Even though cash flow is not a direct claim issue,
it is an indirect cause of claims. When an adverse
cash flow exists at a shipyard due to unadjudicated
changes, the only recourse left to the contractor to
obtain relief is to submit a claim. The basis for
payment to the contractor for shipbuilding contracts
is broken down to two parts. Until 50% of the entire
contract (not necessarily each hull) is completed,
the Government will pay 9 0% of physical progress as
a percent of total provided, the total sum of such
payments may not exceed 10 5% of contract cost. After
passing the 50% completion point, the Government will
pay 95% of physical progress up to 105% of contract
cost. Once the contractor exceeds target cost, cash
provided begins to lag cash spent. At Newport News
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, four of six fixed-
price incentive Navy construction contracts are
either over-running ceiling or are forecasted to over-
run ceiling. An example of cash deficits are those
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was reported by Litton, Electric Boat Division of
General Dynamics, and Newport News Shipbuilding
and Drydock Company. Table D-3 shows the amount of
money withheld in 1974 to these contractors.
F. PROBLEMS OF CLAIMS PROCESSING
Contractors see three major problem areas with the claims
processing procedure: (1) the documentation required by the
Navy in support of claims is excessive; (2) the claims settle-
ment process is lengthy and cumbersome; and (3) the entire
claims process employed by the Navy is costly and unfair.
The Navy agrees that the documentation required is exces-
sive, but is necessary to provide adequate safeguards. To
achieve this end, the Navy Procurement Directives require
that a contractor's claim show: (1) legal basis for entitle-
ment; (2) facts meeting the elements of proof required to
support the basis for entitlement; and (3) adequate factual
support and documentation for the amount claimed in as much
detail as the facts permit. As stated in a recent review
by the GAO , the contractor has the legal burden of proving
his claim, and that burden must be carried by providing
sufficient support to establish the facts he alleges. Many
times , the Navy is required to request additional informa-
tion from contractors after initial submission of the claim.
The claims process is lengthy and cumbersome and part
of this is due to the Government bureaucracy through which
a claim must go. But the shipbuilders are also responsible




Shipyard Period Ending Amount Withheld
Electric Boat 1/21/1^ $26,371,000




submit documentation in support of claims that contain more
trivia than substance; they revise their claims several
times during the course of analysis and settlement; and
they submit claims based on unrecognized legal theories.
Resolving a claim requires a large investment of man-
power by both the contractor and the Government, One reason
that shipbuilders appeal to the ASBCA and the courts is
that they often receive substantially more by this means
than they do from a unilateral decision by a Navy contract-
ing officer. An example was a case with Litton where they
were awarded $3.8 million by the contracting officer and
$17 million by the ASBCA.
G. REASONS FOR CLAIMS
Some say that claims result from the fact that contrac-
tors lose money on shipbuilding contracts. As stated by
RADM Gooding in 1974, there were many events occurring simul-
taneously which resulted in contractor losses. One of these
events was the need to replace a fleet that was becoming
obsolete. At this time, industry infrastructure had deteri-
orated and was not prepared for the onslaught. The decision
was made to rebuild in the late 1950's, and through the early
Kennedy years, prices remained fairly stable, but expansion
meant rising costs and reduced availability of manpower.
Another event which changed the face of Navy shipbuild-
ing occurred in 196M-. Prior to 1964, contracts for ship-
building and ship classes were allocated to industry depend-
ing upon available facilities, and through this procedure.
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major shipbuilders were fairly well assured of their share
of available business at prices which considered individual
circumstances. Starting in 19 BM-, the Navy began using for-
mal advertising for large quantities of ships. Because of
this procedure, the competition was intense, occurring when
costs and labor were fairly stable. It was possible to
make a profit, but expansion and modernization were needed.
With the occurrence of the Southeast Asia conflict, there
was inflation and stiff competition for the available labor
pool.
As of April 1976, all claims and appeals outstanding
were submitted under contracts which were awarded in the
period 1967 to early 1971. This was when the previously
described factors were most prominent.
Admiral Rickover has asserted for many years that the
problems plaguing shipbuilding were not due solely to socio-
economic conditions. The major reason for losses, according
to Admiral Rickover, is poor shipyard management. In his
opinion, private shipyards are not run by technical managers
or experienced shipbuilders, but rather by legal, financial,
and contract experts. He attributes this factor in part to
the fact that the shipyards are owned by large conglomerates
,
and they are interested in making money, not building quality
ships. The major causes of claims in Admiral Rickover 's
estimation are:
1. Most of the major shipbuilding contracts, especially
those for nuclear powered ships, are awarded sole-source or
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with only limited competition. Additionally, the Navy is
using incentive type contracts which places the greatest risk
of cost overruns on the Government.
2. There are no incentives given to the contractor to
control costs or efficiency. Because of this, the Depart-
ment of Defense, in reality, rewards higher costs with higher
profits, and punishes efficiency with lower profits.
3, As long as shipbuilders know that the Government will
bail them out through changes and claims, it will be impossible
to achieve effective cost control, improved efficiency, or
lower costs.
In addition. Admiral Rickover stated:
"The Government and members of the shipbuilding in-
dustry have become mutually hostile groups in that one
desires a satisfactory product at a reasonable price
while the other appears to desire the greatest price the
traffic will bear. These antipathies will continue to
the detriment of the shipbuilders and the Government
unless there is developed a self-discipline manner of
dealing with one another. What we need between these
two hostile groups is the greatest courtesy and con-
sideration. We need a moderation and mutual considera-
tion in their behavior that is not evident today. "'7
H. CLAIMS RESOLUTION
Many of the issues which are the foundation of claims are
present in this case. Some of the other issues that are pres-
ent in claims, but were not covered in this case, are late
and defective GFE , late or inaccurate GFI, delay and disrup-
tion, and change orders. Delay and disruption are outgrowths
of changes and late or defective GFE and GFI. A major per-
centage of claims are hard to definitize in dollar amounts.
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Contractors claim that the documentation required in
submitting a claim is excessive and that the settlement pro-
cess is lengthy and cumbersome.
On the issue of excessive documentation, the Navy con-
tends that it is necessary to ensure that the best interests
of the Navy are protected and that the monies awarded are
justified by fact. As stated in a report by GAO , the con-
tractor has the legal burden of proving his claim and must
provide sufficient data to establish the facts.
On the issue of the required documentation to resolve
claims, the Navy points out there are contractor caused
delays due to incomplete documentation, revisions submitted
during review, and claims that are based on unrecognized
legal theories. The Navy recognizes that the process is too
lengthy and has made recommendations to streamline the
process. The most significant improvement was the establish-
ment of the Claims Review Board headed by Admiral Manganaro.
The Claims Review Board is permanent, whereas before, a new
board was established whenever a claim was received, thus
causing a delay. The Navy has stated its desire to pay what
it owes and will work to that end. Even though some changes
have been made to expedite claim resolution, more effort has
been directed toward improvements in contracting so as to
reduce claim submission.
Another issue brought out in this case was the use of
P.L. 85-804. Deputy Secretary Clements proposed using extra-
ordinary contractual relief to eliminate all existing claims
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and to improve relations with contractors. Even though it
was finally decided not to use P.L. 85-804, the effect of
this statute on future contracting was questioned by Admiral
Rickover. He cited the following problems:
1. How to handle other defense contractors and subcon-
tractors when they request extracontractual relief.
2. How to get Congressional approval for extracontrac-
tual payments to large conglomerates who are report-
ing large profits.
3. How to negotiate payments with contractors so that
it is equitable for all and still satisfies everyone.
He further stated that P.L. 85-804 will not eliminate the
basic problem and it may become harder to conduct business
in the future because: (1) shipbuilders may conclude that
their present approach of accumulating a large backlog of
claims is highly effective. The shipyard's manpower avail-
ability is still acute and there may be a financial incentive
to divert manpower from Navy to expanding commercial work,
if the Navy pays for all delays on Navy work; (2) the Navy
will remain vulnerable because of the limited number of
shipyards and their assertion that they will not perform un-
less claims are settled to their satisfaction; and (3) the
Navy will still have to spend considerable time in negotiat-
ing and administering contracts, trying to pre-price changes,
and contesting unwarranted claims, knowing that the possi-
bility exists for relief if there are overruns.
Admiral Rickover has also been a proponent of nationaliz-
ing the shipyards, as noted earlier, because of the apparent
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unwillingness on the part of the Navy to enforce fixed price
contracts. In his opinion, a claim changes a fixed price
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